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ABSTRACT With an enormous range of applications, the Internet of Things (IoT) has magnetized industries
and academicians from everywhere. IoT facilitates operations through ubiquitous connectivity by providing
Internet access to all the devices with computing capabilities. With the evolution of wireless infrastructure,
the focus from simple IoT has been shifted to smart, connected and mobile IoT (M-IoT) devices and
platforms, which can enable low-complexity, low-cost and efficient computing through sensors, machines,
and even crowdsourcing. All these devices can be grouped under a common term of M-IoT. Even though the
positive impact on applications has been tremendous, security, privacy and trust are still the major concerns
for such networks and insufficient enforcement of these requirements introduces non-negligible threats to
M-IoT devices and platforms. Thus, it is important to understand the range of solutions which are available
for providing a secure, privacy-compliant, and trustworthy mechanism for M-IoT. There is no direct survey
available, which focuses on security, privacy, trust, secure protocols, physical layer security and handover
protections in M-IoT. This paper covers such requisites and presents comparisons of state-the-art solutions
for IoT which are applicable to security, privacy, and trust in smart and connected M-IoT networks. Apart
from these, various challenges, applications, advantages, technologies, standards, open issues, and roadmap
for security, privacy and trust are also discussed in this paper.
INDEX TERMS Security, privacy, trust, protocols, IoT, M-IoT, survey and analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION

Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT) offers vendors a utility
for providing smart services to their users by forming a
highly sustainable, secure and cost-effective network [1]–[3].
The smart M-IoT paves a way for incorporating a large set
of services like healthcare, business monitoring, strategic
planning, public safety communications, weather forecasting, navigation, reconnaissance, and data acquisition [4]–[6].
Security and efficiency of these services are the main objectives of organizations aiming at the spread of smart M-IoT.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Chunhua Su
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.

M-IoT focuses on user-specific commercialization, where
users pay as per their active applications while offering them
with flexible and dynamic procedures for the selection of
a service [7]–[9]. In order to enhance the security, utility
and lifetime of services, most of the established business
enterprises are looking forward to procuring long-range
and low power solutions for connecting billions of devices
to their core networks without much dependence on the
existing infrastructure. Such an ideology allows for easier management and configuration of M-IoT networks and
associated devices. Solutions like Low Power Wide
Area Network (LPWAN), Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN) and Narrow Band-IoT (NB-IoT) are

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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efficient in deploying M-IoT networks [10]–[13]. However,
at the moment, both the technologies are rival to each other
and their applicability and use cases are subject to the decisions of deploying companies and the regulations of the
countries involved in their development. With better reach
and ease of deployment over existing cellular setup, NB-IoT
and Long Term Evolution for Machines (LTE-M) are under
consideration as their unification will enhance the types of
applications for M-IoT by adopting service strategies similar
to mobile networks [14], [15].
The major interests of some leading organizations have
been towards the establishment of a different spectrum
which is also obtained as a dedicated range from their
allocated space or frequency band. Technologies like
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and Network-Function
Virtualization (NFV) provide an altogether different way
for deploying these networks in a secure way [16]–[20].
With a centralized controller, a common node helps to monitor the network, whereas network slicing through NFV
will help to distribute the implementation and management
of SDNs. M-IoT can operate as a separate slice, and a local
or global controller can manage the related activities. Procedures like secondary authentication and group authentication
can be seen as potential solutions for ensuring security in
smart M-IoT. However, the effective implementation of rules
and policies at the control layer due to the configuration complexity and artefacts requires intelligent solutions that can
be assured by using certain aspects of optimization, machine
learning or artificial intelligence.
In smart M-IoT, security refers to the protection of the
infrastructure from potentially hazardous components and
users, which may exploit the network with vulnerabilities,
based on the known/unknown cyber-attacks. For privacy,
it deals with the preservation of lawfulness in sharing the
information about-and-between the involved devices. Since
smart M-IoT will be dealing with a lot of connected components, maintenance of isolation in traffic patterns and establishing anonymity of users becomes an utmost requirement.
Trust refers to the faithfulness in the identification of devices
for communication. It further involves the reputation-building
between the devices and the infrastructure leading a way to
make the network secure while preserving its privacy.
Current market trends have shown that despite several
solutions for establishing M-IoT communications, the end
to end security will be one of the major concerns for the
mobile operators. Identification of new cyber threats, which
consist of zero-day attacks, is another major requirement of
the security industry [21], [22]. It is estimated that M-IoT
will hit the market by 2025 with maximum revenue being
generated from the security, privacy and trust-based services.
Even the major role players will be a low power long-range
communication models, which can be evaluated around
15+ billion dollars at the same time [23]. Thus, it is required
that the existing state-of-the-art must be followed and evaluated on the basis of performance metrics and parameters that
enhance the security, privacy, and trust in M-IoT.
167124

A. ADVANTAGES AND APPLICATIONS OF SMART M-IoT

Smart M-IoT focuses on the applications which help in regulating the daily works of their users. Smart M-IoT provides a different set of applications is largely diversified
areas such as a smart factory, smart city, smart home, smart
grid [24]–[27], healthcare, personal care, emergencies [28],
as shown in Fig. 1. With smart M-IoT, it becomes easier for
both users as well as business organization to accommodate
and host services through intelligent architecture with effective security. In terms of market trends, business houses are
looking at a huge monetary advantage from smart M-IoT
networks and applications. Including these, other advantages
and applications of smart M-IoT are as follows:

FIGURE 1. An overview of M-IoT applications.

•
•
•
•

•

•
•

Formation of the contextual network through intelligent
and rapid data acquisition and processing.
Self-configuring capacity and support for a large set of
devices through a common interface.
Support for human to device and device to device communication with lower overheads and low-complexity.
Information management, processing, and validation
and data flow management across a wide range of the
network.
Support for real-world applications such as driverless
cars, urban-surveillance, smart retailing, industrial Internet, and even provisioning of application base for Augmented Reality (AR)/Virtual Reality(VR) services.
Low-cost deployment and development of personal
applications as well as private networks and clouds.
Requires low-frequent maintenance and can be
operated through distant mode. On-site evaluations
VOLUME 8, 2020
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FIGURE 2. A road map of different studies on security, privacy and trust in IoT and M-IoT.

•

•

may be subject to special requirements and
upgrades.
Supports crowdsourcing as well as edge-computing
models by forming an on-demand network in case of
public safety communications.
Industrial automation and personalized control formations through light-weight and low-complex Integrated
Development Environments (IDEs). Further, M-IoT also
helps in tracking the traffic-flows by incorporating transmissions over dynamic nodes, such as drones, smart
cars, autonomous bicycles and rail networks.

B. UTILITIES, CONTRIBUTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THIS
SURVEY

This survey covers a majority of the content related to
security, privacy, trust-management and protocols for smart
M-IoT networks. The content presented in this article is
competent compared to the existing surveys and is different in
terms of comparative study, which will help its readers follow
the parameters and ideology of existing works. Further, this
survey can be used by the researchers at any level; especially
new researchers can gain a lot from the comparisons and
the roadmap sections. Academicians can follow this article
to teach new trends related to the security of M-IoT and its
advancements. This work can help industry researchers to
follow what has been done and what can be carried further
while deploying applications related to M-IoT. The open
challenges presented in the lateral part of this article will help
to define problem statements and can be used as a rationale
for continuing research on security, privacy and trust aspects
of M-IoT.
This is a comprehensive survey that collectively covers
security, privacy, and trust for smart M-IoT, which otherwise
VOLUME 8, 2020

are presented as individual topics in the existing surveys. The
tabular studies provide a single source to understand the novelty and reach of existing state-of-the-art solutions for smart
M-IoT as per the understanding of the authors. The roadmap
and comparisons with the related survey articles along with
key contents to follow for enhancing the knowledge of this
subject are given in Section II. Section III presents characteristics, challenges, technologies and standards, an overview
of security, privacy and trust along with their methodologies
for evaluation. Section IV gives details on secure frameworks
for smart M-IoT, Section V discusses the security-aware protocols, Section VI presents privacy preservation approaches,
Section VII gives details on trust management approaches,
Section VIII discusses physical layer security and Section IX
gives details on the handover security for smart M-IoT networks. Research Challenges, open issues, and future directions are presented in Section X. Finally, Section XI concludes this article. The details of abbreviations and key terms
used throughout the paper are presented in Table 1.
II. ROADMAP AND COMPARISON WITH RELATED
SURVEY ARTICLES

Fig. 2 helps to follow the roadmap of different surveys presented over the period of time that can be used for selecting an appropriate approach for justifying the requirements
of M-IoT networks in terms of security, privacy, and trust.
In addition to this, Table 2 provides comparative evaluations
and reachability of existing studies which are closely related
to the survey presented in this article. There are limited works
that focus on the details of M-IoT. Only a few of them have
written in parts about such requirements and technologies
for supporting communications in smart M-IoT. Despite the
limited literature in this direction, some of the key and broad
surveys have been selected which provides sufficient material
167125
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TABLE 1. Abbreviations and key terms.

TABLE 2. Comparison with related survey articles.

to be followed for covering the aspects related to security,
privacy, and trust. From the comparisons, it is evident that the
closely related survey is the one provided by Feng et al. [44],
167126

but it covers major portions related to Mobile Crowdsourcing
(MC), which is not so tightly related to the requirements of
smart M-IoT. The other studies in [29]–[36], [39]–[43] do not
VOLUME 8, 2020
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focus on major considerations which are mandatory to form
a highly secure, private and trustworthy M-IoT networks.
Sicari et al. [37], Arias et al. [38] and Yang et al. [45] have
discussed the concepts related to M-IoT, but do not cover
enough details on the security, privacy and trust management
in smart M-IoT. In addition to these, there are no comparative
strategies provided for discussing the protocol and framework
security in any of these surveys, which is a major limitation. Further, handoffs are the major part of mobile-oriented
networks, which are not evaluated in the existing studies.
Thus, the necessity of such a study, in-depth evaluations
and conceptual-reachability of the proposed survey will help
researchers to gain insight into the requirements of secure
communications in smart and connected M-IoT. In addition,
Table 3 presents some of the other key contributions, which
can be followed for understanding the present standings in the
security of M-IoT devices and its applications.
TABLE 3. Some key contributions to follow for security, privacy and trust
in smart M-IoT.

III. SMART MOBILE IoT NETWORKS AND ITS SECURITY:
AN OVERVIEW

This section presents the characteristics and challenges of
smart M-IoT. The details are presented on the different types
VOLUME 8, 2020

of technology enablers, standards, and general stacks for
implementing such a network.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF SMART MOBILE IoT NETWORKS

Smart M-IoT focuses on reliable and sustainable connectivity
between the devices on the move, as shown in Fig. 3. Smart
M-IoT focuses on the establishment of a trust relationship
between the devices through an enhanced reputation-cycling.
Dependence on Machine to Machine (M2M) communication [58], Device to Device (D2D) marking, in-built-service
sharing, and energy conservation are the key characteristics
of M-IoT. With the devices operating in a battery constrained
environment, M-IoT characterizes on the utilization of technologies that offer a wide range but at low battery consumption. The characteristics of smart M-IoT can be summarized
as follows:
• M-IoT includes devices with low power, but operable
up to a wide range with lower complexity and lesser
resource consumptions.
• Supports ultra-dense communication with a unique feature of reliability despite such a huge number of devices
operating simultaneously.
• M-IoT may be subjected to frequent handovers and may
be involved in inter- or intra-handovers depending on
their network design and deployment.
• Licensed and shared spectrum usability with a primary
focus on services similar to short messages. Most of
the applications do not require any retraining, and configurations are automatically loaded as a part of the
application program.
• Smart M-IoT applications and services are vendorspecific. However, the licensing of narrow bands can
be governed by small-scale network organizations with
core setups at the big business houses.
• M-IoT operations are dependent on the synergy
among the mobile operators and rely heavily on the
trust-relationship for their security and distributions.
• One-tap facilities for all the services, where a user just
has to install and load a required feature for experiencing the applications that focus on consumer-electronics,
healthcare of smart home automation.
• M-IoT needs media-independent support for most of
the applications as some of the entities may be operating on 3G, while others may have 4G/LTE or
even the upcoming 5G accessibility through mmWave
functionalities.
• Virtualization and privatization of services are the other
main characteristics of M-IoT. Virtualization has further been leveraged through the properties of network
slicing, which is one of the solutions for distributed
security.
• Support for immediate acquisition, decision and action
are the major features of smart M-IoT. Management of the information and building contextual
relationships are the other unique characteristics of
smart M-IoT.
167127
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FIGURE 3. An exemplary illustration of M-IoT scenario and trends in modern day networks. The figure shows crucial
aspects and properties to be satisfied for the efficient implementation of M-IoT on the backbone of cellular
infrastructure.

B. CHALLENGES OF SMART M-IoT

Despite a huge set of advantages, there are some crucial
challenges associated with the fully-functional usability of
smart M-IoT applications. These include,
• Complexity of design: M-IoT faces a major challenge
because of design complexity for both its applications as
well as network. The applications must be low-complex
and must not require extra knowledge for operations by
its users. Further, with the requirements of ease of use,
M-IoT may cause an excessive burden on the developers
for designing an easy to follow and deploy environment.
• Interaction policies: Smart M-IoT is governed by the
rules through which applications interact with each other
for facilitating the services to its users. However, the difference in the configuration and operable technology
makes it difficult for using common interaction policies
for all M-IoT devices. Thus, the formation of rules and
generation of interaction policies through consensuses
are extremely tedious in M-IoT.
• Security: Independent of technology, security has
always been a concern for all types of IoT applications.
Prevention against known and unknown attacks and
mitigation of zero-day possibilities are the key requirements for security solutions which aim at regulating
M-IoT applications [61]. Security solutions must be
light-weight and should be able to handle the tradeoffs with the performance of a device or the network.
Apart from general security, these networks are also
subject to crucial requirements of handover security,
which can be obtained through existing authentication
mechanisms while focusing either on pre-authentication
or post-authentication mechanisms depending on the
needs and requirements of an application. Management
167128

•

•

•

•

of insider threats and policing are other requirements of
security solutions [62]–[65].
Privacy: With most of the applications personalized
in M-IoT, leakage of a users’ information may pose
a huge threat to the entire network and can destroy
an individual’s belongings. With billions of devices in
place, data privacy may be a reason for huge performance overheads in these networks. Thus, it is inevitably
important to support data privacy which is otherwise a
key challenge for smart M-IoT.
Trust: Security and privacy are established through
trust-relationships between the service providers and
the users. Trust validations and support for commonreputation systems that can guarantee a low-overhead
based mechanism for trust-maintenance are a huge challenge for smart M-IoT networks.
Low-complexity protocols: Different applications need
different protocols to communicate, which raises concerns about compatibility issues in terms of protocol selection and arriving at a general agreement during the sharing of context between the cross-platform
applications. Thus, designing of low-complex protocols with high compatibility and ease of upgrading
are the key challenges to handle in smart M-IoT
applications.
Lifetime: Since the devices in M-IoT are operable
through batteries, it is required that the applications,
as well as network architectural support functions,
should not cause an excessive computational burden on
the devices which may deplete their resources leading to
a network shutdown. Thus, enhancement of life, capacity and coverage should be managed in smart M-IoT
networks.
VOLUME 8, 2020
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TABLE 4. Types of attacks in M-IoT.

FIGURE 4. M-IoT Overview: General characteristics of M-IoT networks, challenges in
implementation, and technologies available for successful deployment of M-IoT.

Apart from these issues, some of the key attacks
in M-IoT, against which effective countermeasures are
required, are listed in Table 4 and the summaries of characteristics, challenges and technologies are shown in Fig. 4.
C. M-IoT TECHNOLOGIES, STANDARDS, AND STACKS

There are a plethora of articles that have discussed various technologies, standards, and stacks which are applicable to M-IoT. However, to make this article self-contained,
general information on some of these are presented in this
section. For further clarification, an illustration of a general overview of a stack applicable to M-IoT is shown
VOLUME 8, 2020

in Fig. 5, which can be further studied from EU Butler Project (https://iot-butler.eu/) [59], [60]; and an exemplary illustration of security, trust and privacy formations in
M-IoT is presented in Fig. 6. At present, M-IoT is based
on low power and wide range technologies, which include
6LoWPAN, LPWAN-based LoRaWAN, Random Phase Multiple Access (RPMA), NB-IoT, Ultra Narrow Band-IoT
(UNB-IoT) Weightless-W, Weightless-P, and Weightless-N
[12], [66]–[70]. Besides these, existing network architectures such as 3G, 4G/LTE, Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access (WiMAX), ZigBee, Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM), can be used for supporting
167129
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FIGURE 5. An exemplary overview of a general communication stack applicable to smart M-IoT (EU Butler-IoT
Project (https://iot-butler.eu/)) [59], [60].

It is recommended to form compatible and ready-to-integrate
models which can be easily deployed in any sort of scenarios irrespective of the device configurations, type and
make. Stacks applicable for general IoT can be used for
extending services in M-IoT but with modifications to their
operating policies as the majority of the traffic flow is maintained on the devices that are non-static in nature [73]. Some
of the key solutions for IoT stacks include IBM-Watson
IoT [74], Microsoft Azure IoT suite [75], OpenIoT [76],
OCF [77], etc.
D. VULNERABILITIES IN SMART M-IoT

FIGURE 6. An exemplary illustration of security, trust and privacy aspects
in M-IoT.

applications in M-IoT. The standards for IoT vary depending
on the application scenario and the configurations of the
devices used in M-IoT. In general, various open projects,
organizations, alliances, and IEEE provide a series of standards that primarily focus on supporting smart applications
in IoT networks. Some of these are TR-069, OMA-DM,
DNS-SD, IEEE series 2413, 21451, 11073, 2200, 2030, 1905,
1900-03, 1701-03, etc. Further details on each of them can
be obtained from [71] and [72]. Apart from these technologies and standards, there are different types of stacks
used for supporting smart mobile communications in IoT.
However, the general use of stack can be application or
network-specific and varies as per the configurations of
each device. Usually, the stack selections will be affected
by the technologies adopted for communications in M-IoT.
167130

Information security is the major factor driving security in
smart M-IoT. These are lead by the studies on vulnerabilities and loopholes at the hardware level, protocol-level, and
application-level of M-IoT. Vulnerabilities are studied based
on the mode of attack and assessment into different types of
classes, related to hardware, protocol, application, software
or organizational [78], [79]. The exploitation of the known
vulnerabilities can be prevented by taking several countermeasures against each of the exploits, however, for unknown
vulnerabilities, it is tedious to distinguish and resolve until
the severity of exploits are unknown [80].
For major of the smart M-IoT, date of release or disclosure plays a crucial role in prevention and it helps to
decide the window of prevention. The release of security
patches and security updates are further accounted for the
disclosure dates. Usually, increasing the speed of deliverables
causes an impact on the debugging phase, which may lead to
several possible vulnerabilities unhandled. In smart M-IoT,
most common vulnerabilities are identified as the OS level
or the application level. The protocol level vulnerabilities
are usually known and steps can be determined based on
the deployment. However, in several cases, where protocol
VOLUME 8, 2020
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FIGURE 7. An illustration of vulnerabilities in smart M-IoT with possible remedies.

security is based on credentials, their theft can lead to severe
consequences. Some of the key issues causing/leading to vulnerabilities, as discussed by Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) [81]–[84] (Fig. 7), for smart M-IoT are
listed below:
•

•

•

•

Insecure infrastructure: One of the main causes of vulnerabilities in smart M-IoT is the insecure infrastructure
that supports transmissions for the involved devices.
Architectural layout plays a key role in accessing the
network and prioritizing its security. The dominant mode
of connections for M-IoT is a cloud, edge, fog architectures, which needs to be prevented from unauthorized
access.
Common managing interface: The services which are
obtained through a common managing interface are
more likely to fall prey to vulnerabilities than the services which are handled by the individual servers. This
can be further seen from another dimension. The exploit
of vulnerabilities over a common interface may expose
the additional services provisioned through it.
Insecure protocols: The protocols mounted for data
sharing and authentication in smart M-IoT may be
vulnerable to attacks leading to authorization and
access control. Thus, the unlimited role of users and
non-predetermining the security of the underlying protocol can be other issues causing vulnerabilities in
smart M-IoT.
Inefficient transport and data encryption: Usually the
broadcasted traffic is not encrypted to avoid performance issues. Thus, vulnerabilities related to access control, such as eavesdropping, is always possible because
majority messages are not encrypted.

VOLUME 8, 2020

•

•

•

•

Cross-site scripting (XSS): Such vulnerabilities are
related to insecure web access and are based on access
controls such as the same-origin policy, which is applicable to all the devices in M-IoT. Self and mutated
XSS are major concerns to be taken care of while dealing
with these types of vulnerabilities.
Firmware insecurity: Identification and decision on
firmware insecurity is not an easy task. These involve
expertise and a common user may easily be fooled to disclosing his/her devices to malicious agents. Such agents
exploit the firmware insecurity and lead to several open
ports which allow backdoors, worms, trojans, botnet and
ransomware to exploit the known/unknown issue on the
device.
Process isolation and unauthenticated scans: Several
users allow different processes to take control of the
device and allow unauthenticated scans. Majority of
them are caused by presenting the requirements of an
installed application. Non-evaluation of the downloaded
application and free access to control the devices leads
to several application-level vulnerabilities.
User policies and patching: In the majority of the cases,
vulnerabilities are exploited due to limited action from
the users. Delays in updating the security settings and
unawareness of the released patches lead to the majority of the vulnerabilities. Nowadays, organizations are
taking several key steps to force the security updates,
still, there is a gap between the user-understandings and
update procedures, which lead to several exploits and
threats on smart M-IoT.

Key solutions and possible remedies for preventing the
above-discussed vulnerabilities are given below:
167131
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Access control: Limiting the control over device-data
and allowing authorized applications to access can help
limit the exploits on the known vulnerabilities. Evaluating the content to be accessed and components of
shared-data can further elevate the security of devices
in smart M-IoT.
• Quick identification and release of patches: It is determined that mode and action and time of action play a
key role in preventing a device. Thus, quick identification of vulnerability, the release of security patches and
installing them are major actions that can prevent severe
attacks.
• Credential management: For the network-based vulnerability prevention, credential-management, its security,
and protection can help to ensure security and privacy
for devices. Credential management prevents access to
sensitive data and keys which are necessary for encryption as well as securing the communication channels.
• Firmware security: It is desired at the developer level to
maintain the bug-free release of firmware. Thus, a strong
debugging and evaluation against known vulnerabilities
must be carried before supplying it to the users or even
assemblers.
• Device policy compliance: It is necessary that users must
comply with the policies laid for a particular device and
should not break the codes, which may allow unauthorized applications to take control over a device. Such a
vulnerable device may expose the entire network and it
is the responsibility of the user to maintain the functionality of the device within the laid guideless.
• Script disabling: Majority of developers have shifted
their focus on developing applications which do not
require client-side scripts. Thus, from futuristic developers, preventing scripts can allow security against vulnerabilities without affecting the services.
• Continuous application security: Identification of application security must be followed by the release of the
security update or newer versions. Thus, continuous
monitoring of applications is required to prevent possible vulnerabilities. Moreover, this is also an effective
strategy to prevent the possibilities of zero-day threats
and attacks.
There are several studies that have been dedicated to vulnerabilities in M-IoT and can be followed from [85]–[92]. Based
on these, it becomes inevitably important to understand the
concept, issues, scope and strength of the present state of
security, privacy and trust for smart M-IoT.
•

E. SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND TRUST FOR SMART M-IoT

Because of a difference in the mode of deployment and
applicability, security, privacy, and trust of M-IoT devices are
of utmost importance. These differences in the characteristics
of involved devices raise an alarming factor for securing and
isolating each user’s operations as the variation in behaviour
and operations of each device may lead to different kind of
threats based on their specifications [93]. Thus, it is important
167132

to study all the aspects related to the security, privacy,
and trust of smart M-IoT networks. Majority of the threats
occur due to inadequate configurations of security properties
and some of them are the vulnerabilities that remain undetected over a course of time due to the negligence of their
developers [94], [95]. Minimizing data acquisition, supporting M2M routing, resolving hidden terminals and encryption can help to secure and privatize each user’s data and
information.
F. METHODOLOGIES FOR ANALYSES OF SECURITY,
PRIVACY, AND TRUST IN SMART M-IoT

An approach is secure for the time being it is not broken,
which means security is difficult to analyze as there are no
direct simulators and emulators to be used for evaluation
of a system for these requirements. Visualization is another
big issue for such requirements. Visualization of trust can
be obtained as it is comparatively easier to define trust as a
metric between the communicating entities; whereas security
and privacy are governed by rules and policies which can only
be evaluated in an attacker environment. Creation and demonstration of such an environment are difficult as it requires
a lot of automation, which is not applicable to most of the
available tools. Majority of the solutions are formally analyzed using Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic, which
is operated on belief theory [119], [120]. Some approaches
follow reduction techniques, while others simply rely on evaluating the computational cost of operations. Apart from these,
some other methods include formal semantic evaluations,
equational theory, etc [121]. Cryptographic solutions can be
evaluated using the random oracle model, inductive methods,
provable security, etc [122]–[124]. Model-checking and theory of proving are used by some approaches for evaluating
the flow of their solution. There are certain tools available
which can be used for these evaluations like, Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications
(AVISPA), A Computational Logic for Applicative Common
Lisp (ACL2), ProVerif, Scyther, etc [125]–[128]. Irrespective
of these evaluations, it is recommended that solutions should
conduct certain case studies while presenting outputs of their
proposed schemes and should demonstrate the effects on the
performance of the system and the network.
IV. SECURE FRAMEWORKS FOR SMART M-IoT

M-IoT networks are vulnerable to a different set of attacks
which can be launched due to improper configurations and
deployment strategies. It is required that these networks are
deployed with ultra-reliable formations, which help to hinder
the launching of any unknown as well as known attacks.
Further, security implications, assessment, and threat modelling can help to identify any such possibilities at a prior,
which may support prevention against intruders during the
operations of IoT devices [129]–[131]. Siboni et al. [132]
highlighted the importance of a framework for securing the
content in wearable IoT devices, which are considered as
an important part of M-IoT systems. The authors developed
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FIGURE 8. A broad classification of the security framework for smart M-IoT. The security approaches focusing on the frameworks for M-IoT can be
broadly classified on the basis of Access control and Authorization, Risk-Assessment features, Authentication, Secure Services, and Anomaly Detection.

an innovative testbed setup for evaluating the security policies of dynamic IoT devices. The need of the hour is to
provide such a framework that can be used for supporting
the security requirements of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
that heavily rely on M-IoT devices for their regular operations [133]. Authorization, privacy as well as physical security and anonymity should be the core aspect of frameworks,
which primarily focus on the security of smart M-IoT
networks [134], [135]. Although the existing frameworks
provide a base for network formations, these have to be
operated with a different set of schemes, protocols, as well
as policy-mechanisms for a fully-reliable and secure network
establishment.
The smart frameworks should also support the cryptic
techniques, that can be built into its system through separate
modules [136]–[138]. Deployment of M-IoT through SDNs
and the use of smart IDS are the future aims of the present
systems, which tend to facilitate the security of applications
operating over low-powered devices [139], [140]. Use of
newer concepts, such as fog architecture, Internet of drones,
catalytic computing and osmotic computing, can be considered as a base for developing frameworks that can sustain the
burden of security as well as the performance at the same
time [141]–[145]. Based on the security requirements, a taxonomy is presented which classifies the security frameworks
for smart M-IoT, as shown in Fig. 8. The details of these
classifications are presented below:
A. ACCESS CONTROL AND AUTHORIZATION-BASED
FRAMEWORK

The security of devices in M-IoT is subject to the management of accessibility and authorization for using particular
services as well as personal data. This type of frameworks
helps to limit control over the usability of network components and provides strong mechanisms for securing the users.
The strength of its security lies in the novelty of architecture
used for supporting convergence services to M-IoT users.
There are some works in this direction, which highlights the
main features of access control and management along with
VOLUME 8, 2020

user and service authorizations. However, the majority of
them operates on general IoT scenario and lacks evidential
commitment on their applicability to smart M-IoT scenarios.
The access control and authorization-based frameworks can
be further classified into three main types as shown below:
• Policy/Rule-based: The main aspects of such type
include user authentication, device authentication,
resource authorization, Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) access control and etc. The solutions in
this direction focus on acquisition and control over
services and user modules to infrastructure security of its
network. The main property of this type is the formation
of governing conditions, on the basis of which, certain
rules and policies are defined for securing the users and
services. Solutions in [96]–[101] focus on providing
frameworks which utilize user and device authentication through policy and rules over device operations in
different network setups.
• Behaviour-based: This type of access control and authorization depends on the way of a user’s interaction with
other users and entities in the network. The operational
activity of the users is taken into account for access
control and defining conditions of authorization for
demanded services. Such types of security frameworks
are well suited for modern services such as smart building, smart cities, and smart factory [102], [103].
• Hybrid: There are certain solutions for access control
and authorization, which form policies or rules by using
behavioural aspects of the network entities to ensure
its security and continuity in operations. Such types of
frameworks are termed as hybrid access control and
authorization-based frameworks. Credential-based services and intelligent solutions use such kind of mechanism for ensuring security in a network [104], [105].
B. RISK-ASSESSMENT-BASED FRAMEWORK

Identification of potential conflicting components and
users through detection modelling is mainly studied under
risk-assessment-based frameworks for security in
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smart M-IoT. Such kind of frameworks helps to pre-identify
any potential risks involved in leveraging services through a
particular aspect of the network. These aspects may include
situational awareness of every involved entity of the network.
Based on the mode of identification, risk-assessment-based
frameworks can be further classified into three main types as
shown below:
• Prediction-based: The Framework which identifies and
manages risk through predictive or estimated evaluations of the network components are termed as
prediction-based risk assessment frameworks [106].
Such type of frameworks considers prior and current
states to identify the mode of operations and uses decision modelling to arrive at a decision of potential risks
in the network.
• Probability-based: In probabilistic-based, the network
is evaluated for different kind of operations which are
executed over a period of time. Then, each process is
operated with a probabilistic model which then helps
to finalize the probabilistic cost of the networks, while
providing knowledge about the factors which dominates
the most and can affect the performance as well as
security policies. The most common aspect of such
frameworks is to identify attack success possibilities in a
network while using parameters like false positives, false
negatives, accuracy, recall, and precision as considered
in [107], [108].
• Standard-based: Most of the organizations have a
pre-defined set of conditions which are to be fulfilled by
every framework which aims to provide a special kind
of services to its users. Majority of these conditions are
the benchmark and supported by standards organizations
such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), International Telecommunications Union
(ITU). These organizations provide guidelines for every
framework to justify its security considerations for the
defined services. One of the examples can be the forensic
study of a framework for its applicability to support
on-demand services to mobile users [109].

architecture and types of services to be supported by the
involved entities. The details on each of them are provided
below:
• Primary: The authentication which is performed with
the core of any network while using the secure channels between the entity and the authentication server
is known as primary mode [110], [111]. Such kind of
authentication is much secure but often suffers from the
consequences of long paths and requirements of route
optimizations. Despite its advantage of providing robust
security, it often causes additional overheads if each time
an entity has to be authenticated through it even in the
cases it is always present in the perimeter of the same
network. However, the majority of existing solutions
prefer a primary mode of authentication because of the
ease of deployment and maintenance.
• Secondary: Usually, networks which have data to be
constrained in a particular periphery or premises opt for
the secondary mode of authentication. Such a model
is responsible for securing a particular set of nodes
which are entitled to communication within the zone
of the secondary authentication server [112]. Secondary
authentication also uses an initial primary authentication
for registering its services and users to the core of the
network and after initial phases, all the security concerns
are managed by it. With the evolution of smart networks,
it is preferred to use a hybrid mechanism as it helps to
provide a flexible as well as robust security that too with
lower overheads.
• Grouped: Another mode of authentication can be the
group authentication, which entitles similar entities to
be authenticated as a group through a common gateway.
Group authentication depends on the type of devices
involved in a group, and the procedure of authentication depends on their type. Some groups with highly
crucial devices may involve strong authentication while
the ones with limited resources may require light-weight
authentications so as to prevent any excessive utilization
of their resources [108].

C. AUTHENTICATION-BASED FRAMEWORK

Type of services affects the security of a network. Some
services may require light-frameworks which are easy on
resources while others may require fast processing frameworks which operate with lesser delays and fewer overheads.
Such type of framework is usually related to the authentication facilities for managing the security of the network as the
authentication phase is itself responsible for resource consumption and delays. Based on the requirements of services,
these frameworks can be classified into time-bound, resourcebound, and hybrid framework as explained below:
• Time-bound: The frameworks which operate with time
as a crucial entity in securing the services and the users
of a network are studied as a time-bound services-based
framework. As studied in [103], [113], such frameworks are lightweight and highly fast in processing and

D. SECURE SERVICES-BASED FRAMEWORK

Authentication of the users and devices in smart M-IoT
is of utmost importance and highly crucial. It is required
that all the services are provided only to the users which
authenticates themselves with the security servers usually
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) in any
network. These secure servers ensure the safety of other legitimate and authenticated users by providing a secure mode of
communications. One of the crucial aspects of authentication
is the positioning of authentication-server along with the
number of passes required to reach it. The mode of authentication is quite vast, but for smart M-IoT, it can be classified into the primary mode of authentication, the secondary
mode of authentication and group-authentication. The choice
among each of them depends on the types of device, network
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evaluation of security policies. Usually, such frameworks perform periodic evaluations on the time consumed in authenticating users and allocating communication uplink for data transmissions. Evaluation time,
discovery time, and authentication time are the crucial
parameters in time-bound security frameworks.
Resource-bound: Most of the devices in smart M-IoT are
low on resources and suffer from the threat of average
lifetime. Usually, their lifetime is driven by the energy
and memory consumed by the services operational on
each device and often the mandatory services consume
the majority of their services [97], [100], [114]. Thus,
it becomes important to develop frameworks which
focus on the security while keeping control of the utilization of M-IoT resources with a limited burden on the
operational control and activity of the device. Such type
of frameworks uses checkpoint mechanism to manage
the resource consumption for the security of M-IoT
applications.
Hybrid: Nowadays, smart applications tend to be
time-bound as well as resource-bound. Thus, there is a
requirement of frameworks which can apply both these
features while forming a hybrid services-based framework that can use both the resource-checkpoints as well
as periodic evaluation of security policies for securing
activities in smart M-IoT. Accessibility and response
time can be considered as mutual parameters for accessing the performance of such frameworks [102].

E. ANOMALY DETECTION-BASED FRAMEWORK

Identification of false users, false services and false entities
in a network are studied under this category. It is a responsibility of the security framework to identify communities
and users which pose potential risks to legitimate users of
the network. Further, such a classification helps to manage
the flow of information as well as limit the accessibility
of users with harmful properties and high risks to network
services. Anomaly detections are performed by checking the
correctness of a device or user against the predefined policies
of accurate operations. On a broader side, such frameworks
can be classified into on-site and off-site evaluators with the
description as given below:
• On-site: The real-time evaluation of the users for legitimate and accurate operations is classified as on-site or
real-time anomaly detection. Such type of detections
is performed by deploying real-time Intrusion Detection System IDS) which dedicated sniffs the traffic
without breaking its flow and without any excessive overheads [115]–[117]. Majority of evaluations are conducted through sandboxes which do
not reveal their identity to the users and prohibits
anomaly users from accessing the services across the
network.
• Off-site: In some cases, real-time evaluations may pose
an excessive burden on the network and it is difficult
to analyze the high flow of data. Such networks are
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evaluated off-site at their respective data centres which
check for the presence of any abnormal activity for each
of its users. Usually, such type is suitable for scenarios which allow delayed transactions without affecting
the services such as payment gateways or smart-phone
updates [65], [116], [118].
F. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS

In this section, we have summarized different types of
frameworks, which help to secure the operations as well as
the network layout of smart M-IoT. The summarized study
divides the existing solutions into five broad categories and
considering their evaluation metrics and ideologies, a stateof-the-art comparison is presented in Table 5, which compares the key IoT frameworks with specification on smart
mobile network formations. The table helps to understand
the reachability of each approach and their primary application of interest. These comparisons can be used for understanding what has been attained so far and what are the
directions yet to be focused while securing applications in
smart M-IoT networks. Hybridizing network layouts with
security policies and involving vulnerability assessments can
be used for developing security middleware for smart M-IoT
applications. As discussed in [96], [97], security resources,
user authentication, device authentication, resource utilization and data investigations should be included
while developing frameworks for securing smart M-IoT.
There are many solutions, which only relies on CoAP, but it
is desired to make strategic shifts for enhancing the security
of devices and users against known as well as unknown cyber
threats.
V. SECURITY-AWARE PROTOCOLS FOR SMART M-IoT

It is to be considered that with the introduction of new technologies for communications, the links between the M-IoT
devices have grown up to many Gigabits, which means the
window to perform security operations has further decreased,
and it is extremely challenging for the researchers to accommodate existing security policies in such a short timing
window. Thus, protocols for M-IoT security are yet to be
revolutionized on the basis of their applicability and reachability for M-IoT applications. Security protocols prevent
unauthorized attempts for using resources or data in a defined
network [31], [175]. Communications in M-IoT are usually
handled by the dissemination protocols like CoAP, Advanced
Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP), Message Queuing
Telemetry Transport (MQTT), Domain Name Server-Service
Discovery (DNS-SD), etc [176], whereas security is supported either by enhancing the features of these protocols;
or by using existing security protocols with the routing
schemes; or by designing novel security and communication
schemes which are usually specific to applications [177],
[178]. Such solutions may operate well in one scenario and
may fall prey to different types of attacks if their application area is changed. The success of the security protocols
is affected by the compliance degree of a user with the
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TABLE 5. State-of-the-art frameworks applicable to M-IoT security.
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FIGURE 9. A broad classification of secure protocols in smart M-IoT. The existing solutions can be classified into secure
routing, authentication mode and hierarchy, and property-based secure protocols.

recommended settings [179], [180]. It is required that security
protocols should not affect the performance and their operations (like encryption and decryption) should be completed
without many overheads.
Protection of Peer to Peer (P2P) and Peer to Multi-Peer
(P2MP) links is one of the major challenges while designing
protocols for the security of M-IoT. Protocols can be protected either by following asymmetric mode or symmetric
mode in their key operations. The location of the AAA server
and its optimized placement are other issues to be resolved
in M-IoT. Moreover, Route optimizations are additional concerns which have to be taken care by the security protocols.
Previously known protocols, like Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Hypertext Transfer
Protocol Secure (HTTPS), Session Initiation Protocol (SIP),
can be adopted for network security while authentication can
be governed by Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
as it is one of the standard protocols used for security in 3G.
Some other crucial protocols include Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), Remote Access Dial-In User Service
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(RADIUS), DIAMETER, Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA), Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol (LEAP), Protected Extensible
Authentication Protocol (PEAP), etc. EAP is further facilitated with suitable extensions as AKA, AKA-prime (AKA’),
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Message Digest-5 (MD5),
Tunneled Transport Layer Security (TTLS), Encrypted Key
Exchange (EKE), Generic Token Card (GTC), Pre-Shared
Key (PSK), Password (PWD), etc [181], [182]. Handover
protection is also related to the protocols as these are identified as a crucial part of security in M-IoT. Majority of
them use EAP-based authentication (EAP-TLS). Some of
the key contributions on handover security include Security Protocol for Fast PMIPv6 (SPFP), Handover Optimized
Ticket-based Authentication (HOTA), Ticket-based authentication (TA), Secure Password Authentication Mechanism
(SPAM), etc [157]. These protocols can be classified into
routing-based, authentication-mode based, authenticationhierarchy-based, and property-based mechanisms, as shown
in Fig. 9.
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A. SECURE ROUTING-BASED

The routing schemes which are available for general networks, be it reactive or proactive, holds true for smart M-IoT
setups. Existing routing mechanisms can be used while leveraging the security guidelines to secure the communications
between the M-IoT users. From a broader point of view,
secure routing-based protocols can be classified into the following types:
• Route Optimization (RO)-based relaying: Finding shortest paths and reducing the path of authentication can
be attained through optimized relaying in the networks.
Such RO-based relaying often removes dependencies
from the intermediate entities to provide low-overhead
based solutions for security [146].
• Trust-based relaying: Finding nodes on the basis of
trust calculations and using them for transmissions are
another kind of security protocols. Such protocols use
trust as a weighted metric for calculating paths between
the users in M-IoT [147].
• Cluster-based relaying: In some scenarios, network entities operate in a group while depending on a core entity
which acts as their head leading to the formation of multiple clusters in the network. There are certain routing
protocols which aim to support the security of communication between the cluster heads allowing secure
relaying between the nodes with lesser overheads and
computational complexity [148]. Clustering is effective
in case the protocols depend on group-based authentication, however, in primary and secondary modes of
authentication, it may cause excessive overheads.
• Secure-Medium Access Control (MAC) based relaying: Control over timing policies and accessibility of
user operations lead to the requirements of a secure
MAC-based relaying for users in smart M-IoT. Such
relaying protocols use command over congestion window and packet forwarding policies to control the flow
of packets as well as uses cryptographic solutions for
securing its relaying procedures [149], [150].
• Cross-layer-based relaying: Secure routing can be
obtained over the network layer while obtaining properties from other layers such as the transport layer or
the MAC layer. The protocols on the network layer
use parameters like Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and use it as a weighted condition to select
nodes in smart M-IoT [151]–[153]. Such a relaying can
be effective in scenarios where the resources are limited
and the lifetime of the network is of utmost importance.
• Topology-based relaying: Identification of nodes on the
basis of their location and checking the path of authentication before transmissions lead to the formation of
secure topology-based routing [154]. Such protocols are
effective where the dynamic nature of nodes is crucial
and often changes. However, it is difficult to control such
a scenario and topology-aware relaying is often combined with mobility-management procedures for attaining a secure and fast relaying.
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IP-based relaying: This is the core relaying mechanism for the majority of the mobile applications
as it uses Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) and Fast Mobile
IPv6 (FMIPv6) procedures to support the selection of
nodes. Further, the security in such protocols is provided by proxy-mechanisms and can be seen in various proxy-based protocols such as Proxy Mobile IPv6
(PMIPv6) and F-PMIPv6 [155]–[157]. Such relaying
solutions can be combined with media independent
schemes to form Media Independent Handover (MIH)PMIPv6 relaying with specific implementation over
smart M-IoT applications.
Mobility-based relaying: Mobility management is often
studied as a part of handovers; however, existing routing schemes can be classified on the basis of mobility
management. Such schemes are responsible for securing
the path of the nodes when they are moving in an intraor inter-mode of a given authentication server. Mobility management schemes can be studied as distributed,
centralized, semi-distributed or even hierarchical [146],
[158], [159].

B. AUTHENTICATION MODE-BASED

Similar to authentication-based frameworks, authentication
protocols allow identification of legitimate users which can
interact with each other for acquiring particular services over
the network. Authentication protocols help to validate the
users for transmissions in M-IoT. These protocols help to
achieve reliable trust and security for exchange information.
On the basis of mode of operations, the authentication protocols can be classified into the following two types:
• Proactive: Authentication protocols which focus on
pre-verification of the users before beginning the transmissions are termed as proactive authentication [157],
[158], [160]. Such schemes are highly reliable but sometimes slower in operations. Thus, these are often the
primary preference of setups that focus on the services
over smart M-IoT.
• Reactive: Authentication protocols which focus on the
on-demand verification of the users and support a direct
linking between the network users are termed as reactive
authentication [161]. Reactive authentication is fast in
operations, but is usually, vulnerable to a lot of network
attacks which raises a question about their secure usability for smart M-IoT. However, with modern solutions
like crowdsourcing [183] and blockchains [184]–[186],
reactive protocols can be extended and secure for their
usability in smart M-IoT setups.
C. AUTHENTICATION HIERARCHY-BASED

Authentication involves multiple entities which secure themselves by verifying each other either directly or through
an Authentication Server (AS). On the basis of operations
and hierarchy, authentication protocols can be classified into
one-way or two-way authentication based protocols.
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One-way authentication: One-way authentication involves
user-side verification with respect to the rules provided
by the governing server (AAA or AS) [162]. The genuineness of the users is proved by the properties which
are only shared by the user itself.
Two-way authentication: Two-way authentication
involves both user-sides as well as server-side verifications [163], [164]. The genuineness of the users,
as well as the servers, is proved through their respective
properties which are shared amongst them. Two-way
authentication can further be extended into different
modes of handshakes depending on the level of security
to be verified before beginning the transmissions.

D. PROPERTY-BASED

Security protocols can also be classified on the basis of properties which are used for securing the transmissions between
the nodes. Based on some key requirements, the security
protocols can be categorized on the basis of the following
properties:
•

•

•

Freshness-based: Freshness means that messages
exchanged in a session are generated specifically for
a particular session. The attacker cannot use the previous session for messages. Freshness based protocols
are used for communication between the two parties
by establishing a secure channel on the basis of the
freshness of sessions. The receiver believes that the
obtained information is fresh and authenticated. Freshness is achieved by updating keys and sessions through
consistent changes in parameters like seeds, nonce and
sequence numbers of involved entities in smart M-IoT.
Approaches based on freshness of keys and sessions are
discussed in [146], [156], [164]–[170].
Encryption-based: Encryption is an interesting piece
of technology that works by scrambling data or
information so it is unreadable by attackers.
Encryption is a key-based approach to combine confidentiality and integrity, and provides a secure mechanism against external threats such as chosen-plaintext
and chosen-ciphertext attacks. Encryption based protocol ensure the confidentiality of sharing information
between the users in smart M-IoT [146], [154], [156],
[163], [164], [166]–[174].
Access-based: Limiting users from accessing a particular service is one of the key requirements of smart M-IoT
applications. Protocols which can help to define a role
to every user and control their activity are classified
into access-based security protocols. There are a lot of
existing solutions, which aim at enhancing the security
of the mobile network by limiting the user operations
while using the policies for information flow, management, and control [146], [163], [164], [166]–[174].
A highly stabilized access control protocol can prevent
misleading or eavesdropper from gaining access to crucial information in smart M-IoT.
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System Integrity-based: System integrity protection is
a necessary step to ensure a high level of security.
As discussed in [132], [156], [163], [164], [166], [169],
[173], [174], development of system integrity protection
protocols can help to manage information disturbances
and prevent attacks. The involved parties in smart M-IoT
setups want to assure that all the remote data they receive
is from systems that satisfy the users’ integrity requirements. Therefore, it is important that system integrity
based protocols can protect the information results from
being polluted by attackers.

E. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS

In this section, we presented a detailed study of security-aware
protocols for smart M-IoT. Following the above-discussed
classification, some major contributions to security protocols
which are applicable to M-IoT are highlighted in Table 6.
The existing protocols are evaluated on the basis of system
integrity, freshness, confidentiality, mutual authentication,
access control, overheads, encryption, and non-repudiation.
Apart from these, several schemes can be followed by
SPORE [204], which is a repository of security protocols. Over the last decade, protocols have been improvised
by utilizing security as a crucial metric to decide a path;
however, with the evolution of new CPS, dynamic nodes, and
energy-constraint mobile devices, this direction of research
remains open and require protocols, which can operate
beyond authentication. Research can be extended towards
the designing of a secure protocol stack, which can include
channel as well as message protection without compromising
the QoS to its users. Network patrolling, perimeter evaluation,
and deployment of intrusion detection protocols can help to
further secure the operations of smart M-IoT.
VI. PRIVACY PRESERVATION APPROACHES
FOR SMART M-IoT

Data in M-IoT is highly crucial as well as sensitive and any
eavesdropping may result in leakage of users’ personal information [205], [206]. With data processing reaching a fine
granularity level, it becomes tedious to privatize the content
as new issues arise because of many dependencies on the
platform used for transmissions. The collection and control
of data are two of the main reasons that increase threat-level
for data privacy in M-IoT [207]–[209].
With the difference in architectural deployment, smart
M-IoT possesses large-scale implications for removing issues
which may leak the entire information of the networks. Most
of the approaches fail to support access control and authorization while deploying applications for smart M-IoT networks.
Reducing the reachability of every user and keeping a watch
on the amount and level of contents accessed by an individual
can help in privacy-preservation [29], [210], [211].
Encryption of data for every link can further help this
cause, however, with the networks attaining a high-speed
property, it becomes necessary to support both encryption and
decryption at a rapid pace [212]. Majority of the intermediate
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TABLE 6. State-of-the-art protocols for M-IoT security.
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FIGURE 10. A broad classification of privacy-preservation schemes for smart M-IoT. The existing solutions can be
studied by classifying them into encryption-based, architecture-based, protocol-based, and tool-based mechanisms for
privacy preservation.

procedures should be done on the cipher itself, as this will
help to prevent any unauthorized decryption of the text being
shared between M-IoT devices. Further, approaches can use
customized identifiers for creating policies for maintaining
the anonymity of access between its users. Along with these,
prevention of hidden terminals is another major requirement
for privacy-preservation [213]–[216].
Practical problems like network partitioning and isolations
increase the risks of leakage of data and it is necessary to
formulate approaches that can help to identify such issues
before-hand and with low-complexity [217]–[221]. Data privacy can be guaranteed by using solutions, which prevent
sniffing and do not yield any information even if discovered
by intermediates [222]–[224]. This can be further enhanced
by using a non-store approach, which refers to the immediate
forwarding of the data without consuming the excessive time
stamp as well as keeping the freshness of the keys. Privacy can
further be assured by preventing third party-based evaluations
as these may disclose the encryption mechanisms of the entire
route as well as of the traffic [225].
Distribution of incoming traffic not only prevents DoS or
DDoS but also helps to make sure about the identification
of any eavesdropper that may be listening to the incoming
or outgoing traffic [226], [227]. Updating security policies,
maintenance of logs and refining network architecture at
regular intervals for the detected traffic and anomalies can
further help in privacy-preservation of M-IoT networks [228].
Some of the major contributions on data privacy in IoT,
which are applicable to M-IoT architecture, are discussed
in Table 7. These schemes can be further classified
into four major types, encryption-based, architecture-based,
protocol-based and tool-based privacy preservation, as shown
in Fig. 10. The details of each of these are provided below:
A. ENCRYPTION-BASED

Privacy is mainly the protection of personal information of users and devices in smart M-IoT. Disclosure of
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information can be protected through encryption of data
which prohibits any eavesdropper from obtaining any knowledge even if he or she is able to capture the majority of its
parts. Encryption-based schemes are not different from usual
encryption algorithms. Thus, the existing solutions can be
classified into traditional encryption schemes on the basis of
an algorithm or mechanism used by them for protecting the
data. These types are as follows:
•

•

•

Symmetric encryption: The symmetric key encryption
relies on the same key for encryption and decryption
i.e. the key used for the encryption and the decryption should be same at both the parties. Symmetric-key
encryption is essentially the same as a secret code that
each of the two entities must know in order to encrypt
and decrypt information. The symmetric key encryption
has the major problem of exchange overheads of keys
between the two parties, especially with maintaining
trust when encryption is used for authentication and
integrity checking [190].
Asymmetric encryption: Asymmetrical encryption is
also known as public-key cryptography, uses two keys
to encrypt or decrypt of a plain text. The secret keys are
exchanged over the Internet or a large network. The message encrypted by a public key can only be decrypted
using a private key and similarly, data encrypted using
a private key can only be decrypted using a public
key [191]–[198]. Asymmetric encryption is far better in
ensuring the security of information transmitted during
communication.
Homomorphic encryptions: Homomorphic encryptions
allow complex mathematical operations to be performed
on encrypted data without compromising the encryption.
The encrypted data set is transformed into another data
set by preserving relationships between elements in both
sets. Studies conducted on the topic of Homomorphic
encryption in [199]–[201] highlight their applicability
over the smart M-IoT.
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TABLE 7. State-of-the-art approaches for data privacy in M-IoT.
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B. ARCHITECTURE-BASED

Privacy preservation schemes can also be marked on the basis
of architecture used for deployment and operations. Generally, the existing solutions depend on a centralized mechanism, but with solutions like blockchain which primarily uses
public key operations, the architectural deployments become
distributed.
• Centralized: Approaches which use a controller or centralized entity as a key enabler for privacy-preservation
are studied in this type. Centralized solutions are effective from the monitoring perspective, but these pose a
threat to a single point of failure which is difficult to sustain for any network [202]. Especially, in smart M-IoT,
if all the traffic is regulated by the centralized authority, it becomes necessary to develop schemes which
will define the policies of load management as well as
prevent excessive utilization of resources for the traffic
coming from a single source.
• Distributed: Such schemes depend on the distributed and
flat nature of architectures and prevent a common point
of failure as privacy preservation is initiated by the user
or a node which are abstracted from other components
of the network. In some scenarios, multiple nodes are
used for defining policies for privacy preservation. However, the success of such approaches depends on their
compliance degree and synergy in supporting common
algorithms for a large set of nodes [187], [203].
C. PROTOCOL-BASED

As discussed in the protocol section, privacy can be supported
by defining rules which are operated as a part of conditions
and help to decide on the sharing of information between
the users. Protocol-based privacy is easier to achieve and an
efficient way for networks that operate in close proximity to
each other [171], [187]. Such schemes are extremely useful
for networks using crowdsourcing and can be used as broadcast mechanisms for blockchain-based distributed solutions
for privacy preservations.
D. TOOL-BASED

Such an approach is easier to manage as it only involves process like masking, tagging or user-controlled policies [147],
[188], [189]. Tool-based privacy is governed by the properties
and services offered by the application platforms running
for smart M-IoT. However, the correctness of such solutions
is dependent on the legitimacy of the service providers and
their honesty which cannot be measured through any tool and
depends on the level of commitment to their users.
E. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS

In this section, we summarized the privacy-preservation
approaches for smart M-IoT on the basis of encryption,
architecture, protocols, and tools. Data privacy is achievable
through message protection and protocols can be used for
authorizing applications and users before accessing personalized data of the smart M-IoT owner. Privacy can be attained
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through novel security protocols as well as the positioning of
AAA that can ensure the end to end data privacy.
Policy-based, identity-based, ID-based, attribute-based
encryptions and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be
the major enables for privacy preservation. Solutions, like
blockchain and tangle (directed acyclic graph), can be used
for preserving privacy through transactions between smart
M-IoT users. The choice of encryption plays a key role as
it affects the policies of session management between end to
end devices based on the factors like freshness, integrity and
perfect forward secrecy, which are attainable through secure
key operations. More advances are expected in tool-based
privacy preservation as well as personalized management as
users are becoming much aware and demand personalized
settings for each operation.
VII. TRUST MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
FOR SMART M-IoT

M-IoT aims at maintaining a secure relationship between the
entities involved in service provisioning as well as data dissemination [253], [254]. Most of the trust-enabled networks
establish a reputation system based on a centralized entity that
can help to check whether a particular node in the network can
be relied upon or not. Such evaluations of reliability are an
integral part of trust management systems [255]. With a billion of devices, the complexity of maintaining trust increases
and it becomes relatively difficult to handle such an enormous
number of devices, which leads the network into attacks by
false reputation enhancement of an intruder [256].
Most of the trust management systems are governed by
policies which are decided on the basis of the configurations
of the network as well as the types of services supported by
the M-IoT devices [257]. Trust management depends heavily
on the distributed computations as slow computations may
cause excessive overheads which are a hazard for secure
systems. Crowdsourcing, computational offloading, dividing
of service accessibility, distributed policy formations, distributed trust maintenance, and D2D computations, help in
reducing the overheads and complexities associated with the
building of trust-relaying systems for M-IoT [258]–[261].
Trust-based solutions for smart M-IoT can be classified into
the following types, as shown in Fig. 11:
A. ARCHITECTURE-BASED

Trust in smart M-IoT is attainable through a unique implementation of architecture while placing each entity in such a
way that it provides a pathway for believing each other before
communications. On the basis of architectural setup, trust
management approaches can be classified into the following
three types:
•

Centralized: It constitutes an entity which is present at
the centre of a given network and is responsible for
handling trust computations for the entire network [232].
The problem with such a deployment is the risk of a
single point of failure.
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FIGURE 11. A broad classification of trust-management schemes for smart M-IoT. The existing solutions can be studied
by classifying them into architecture-based, property-based, decision-based, and IDS-based trust management in
smart M-IoT.

•

•

Distributed: It constitutes trust evaluation through distributed entities which prevent a single point of failure.
Distributed trusts are usually operated as P2P or P2MP,
but not peer to all [233].
Hierarchical: It constitutes calculations by using a layered architecture which focuses on evaluating trust for
entities on each layer [147], [234], [235]. This allows
the selection of accurate nodes in the next order of
hierarchy.

B. DECISION-BASED

Trust is a decision-based entity, which in some cases is
marked by following certain principles of communications.
Node management and selection of the next-hop are two of
the examples of decision-based trust management. On the
basis of ideology, decision-based trust management can be
categorized into the following two types:
• Policy-based: Using conditions to take a decision on the
situation of entities is treated as a policy-based solution.
The policy-based approach often results in a centralized
or hierarchical solution as a governing body is required
to form the policies for evaluating trust of the involved
entities in smart M-IoT [236], [237].
• Rule-based: Using conditions to evaluate given information for generating relevant knowledge regarding the
trust of an entity is treated as a rule-based solution.
The rule-based approach utilizes any type of architecture; however, it always has dominance for deciding
rules or a consensus model for arriving at a common
decision while formulating principles of trust
evaluations [238], [239].
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C. PROPERTY-BASED

Trust is itself a property of a device in smart M-IoT. However, this core property can be classified into sub-categories
through which trust can be ensured in any type of network as
explained below:
• Reputation-based: Reputation is a fundamental concept
in several situations which can be involved in the interaction between mutually distrusting parties [240], [241].
Reputation-based trust relies on a ‘‘soft computational’’
approach to formulate the problem of trust. The trust
systems rely on the basic idea of analyses and a combination of paths and networks of trust relationships. Trust
and reputation systems play a significant role in decision support for Internet-mediated service provisioning.
Reputation-based trust management helps to mitigate
the security complications of smart M-IoT [242].
• Behaviour-based: Behaviour-based trust models include
a fixed evaluation scheme. The scheme uses the knowledge of behaviour in previous interactions and derives
the trustworthiness of an entity [243], [244]. The
behaviour-specific knowledge can be obtained from the
feedbacks and recommendations.
• Heuristics based: Heuristics are used to aid the decision
or estimation process by evaluating the indirect trust of
an agent into the direct trust estimation. The decision
formulation is handled with the estimation through metrics [245], [246].
• Pattern-based: A set of design patterns are used for
designing systems with the explicit intention of increasing trust between entities. The behavioural patterns are
followed to achieve sustainable trust. Patterns are used to
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•

solve recurring problems in trust-based communications
for smart M-IoT. Patterns have been developed in a range
of disciplines for a variety of domains to make a trust
model. The patterns can be obtained by behaviour, rules,
policy, flow, etc [247].
Anomaly detection based: The anomalies are abnormal behaviour which is intended to affect the systems.
Anomalies can be detected based on their own signatures and settings. The rules and threat modelling can
be done with the help of system behaviours and signatures. Anomalies are inspected over the high malicious
network traffic to improve the detection accuracy of
trust model [248], [249]. Signature-based IDS are the
well-known anomaly detection systems in smart M-IoT
networks.
Hybrid: Such a trust management system which
combines all the above-discussed solutions into a single mechanism is a part of hybrid trust management in smart M-IoT. Hybrid approaches use all the
existing property-based approaches and choose the
one which suits best to the given conditions and
configurations [250].

solutions can be modelled into secure communication systems through security protocols, which use encryption policies for defining new security schemes by using a similar
model of trust-relaying systems [35], [266], [267]. To summarize, a detailed state-of-the-art comparative study on various trust management schemes is presented in Table 8, which
can be extended for their use in the smart M-IoT environment.
The table helps to understand the key features and parameters
focused by most of the existing solutions along with their core
ideology for maintaining trust between the IoT entities.
VIII. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FOR SMART M-IoT

E. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS

Unlike traditional security solutions, which focus on the
logical aspects of the networks, physical security is hardest
and difficult to follow because of a difference in the type
and make of an M-IoT device. With each device following
a different set of parameters and configurations, it becomes
difficult to provide a common solution which can withstand
the Channel State Information (CSI) requirements of the
entire network while securing the physical transmission of
the network [282]–[284]. Network coding and multiplexing
approaches usually rely on cryptographic solutions only to
reduce the complexity of physical layer; however, this makes
the system vulnerable to different types of attacks that can
be launched over the used mechanisms. With devices being
operated on battery, physical layer security becomes far more
challenging and should be attained with lesser overheads
as well as a lesser number of computations. A highly burdened operation may deplete the energy resources and an
operational M-IoT network becomes of no use. The types
of technology, 3G, 4G/LTE or upcoming 5G, play a crucial
role in selecting an approach that can fit into the physical
configurations as well as can support the load at a dedicated
frame size [283], [285], [286].
Designing of security schemes on the physical layer may
seem to be difficult, but it provides all set of new opportunities
for improving the QoS as well as QoE for the end-users.
The strength of the physical layer security depends on the
adversary model which is used for evaluating the developed
solution [282], [288]. Such solutions are usually driven by
the assumptions of the CSI as well as device type and may or
may not stand once new vulnerabilities are discovered over
a course of time [289]–[291]. The existing solutions can be
broadly classified into two main types, service-based physical layer security, and channel-based physical layer security,
as shown in Fig. 12. The details on both of these are presented
below:

In this section, we provided a detailed classification of trust
management approaches for smart M-IoT. Trust relationships
not only secure the M-IoT but also help in building reliable CPS. Evaluation of trust by using a limited set of metrics
is a challenge for M-IoT, however, such a system offers
huge scalability and can be operated with less management
and better control [32]. Incorporation of software security,
privacy control, and security constraints further strengthen
the trust modelling in M-IoT. Along with these, trust-based

Physical layer security in smart M-IoT can be obtained
through service management, control over interference issues
and performing accessibility management. Based on the services supported by the smart M-IoT, physical layer security
can be studied in three parts:
• Cryptographic: The solutions, which use cryptographic
mechanisms for preventing any eavesdropping, are

•

D. THIRD PARTY-BASED

Depending on external mode for calculating trust is one of the
prominent solutions of modern-day networks. Such a solution
uses mechanisms like deep learning, data analytic, neural
networks or AI for evaluating the trust of communicating
entities. Based on the outputs from third-party evaluations,
there can be two main types:
• Certificate-based: Providing a certificate of assurance
on the successful evaluation of required trust is easier and a comprehensive solution, which is also capable of providing a detailed report on the operations
of a device [251], [252]. Third parties use certain
policies, cookies, and cached entries to ensure trust
while generating certificates for the required device in a
smart M-IoT.
• Rating-based: In certain scenarios, third parties are
involved in giving ranking or ratings to each individual involved in the formation of the network. Such an
approach is termed as rating-based trust management.
A threshold is marked on the basis of some predetermined score and each entity is evaluated against this
threshold value [147], [241].
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TABLE 8. State-of-the-art approaches applicable for trust management in M-IoT.
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traffic and such an approach is classified into encoding based solution. These are performed through binary
codes [280], [281].
C. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS

FIGURE 12. A broad classification of secure physical layer schemes for
smart M-IoT. The existing solutions can be classified into service-based
and channel based mechanisms.

•

•

studied in this type. As discussed in [268], [269],
these systems combine physical layer properties with
cryptographic mechanisms to ensure the safety of
communication between the devices in M-IoT. Such
security is complex to attain but has powerful
applicability.
Access Control and Transmissions: The solutions, which
control the signal possessions by the users as analyzed
in [270]–[274], are studied in this type. Access control
and transmission-based solutions are generally low complex and focus on interference management along with
control over secrecy probability.
Jamming: There are certain solutions as provided
in [275]–[277], which prohibit users from unintentional uplink or downlink in a specified zone. These
approaches are responsible for energy-efficient security
at the physical layer.

B. CHANNEL-BASED

Physical layer solutions which emphasize the security of
channel used for communications are dependent on the signal alterations and induction of bit codes into the transmission medium. Such solutions should operate with a
low-complexity and their operations must be completed in a
few nanoseconds. The success of these solutions depends on
the type of communication setup used for transmissions and
the approaches used for securing the bits. Based on the mode
of operations, these can be classified into modulation-based
and encoding-based solutions:
• Modulation-based: Such schemes changes the signal properties (Amplitude, Phase, or Frequency)
for preventing any eavesdropping on the transmitted data. In general, secure-spectrums can help to
attain modulation-based channel security in smart
M-IoT. These solutions are performed by using carrier
waves [278], [279].
• Encoding-based: Using different codes for the security
algorithms at the physical layer helps to secure the
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In this section, we summarized the existing studies into
two main categories of physical-layer approaches namely,
service-based and channel-based solutions. These solutions
were further studies by classifying them on the basis of
cryptographic mechanism, access control and transmission
policies, jamming facilities, modulation, and encoding. From
the study, it is evident that channel estimation, M2M modelling, fading losses, noisy models, energy-constraints are
some of the crucial aspects to be taken care of while deploying
security solutions for physical layer in M-IoT [303]–[306].
Physical security of the M-IoT network is also impacted by
the burden of devices and interference-management, which
are driven by the density of the network. Most of the physical
layer security solutions are driven by Signal-to-Interference
Ratio (SIR), Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR),
secrecy, outage policies, and transmit energies. Despite a
plethora of approaches for IoT’s physical layer security, there
are only a few solutions which can withstand the requirements
of M-IoT; thus, a comparison study is presented in Table 9,
which helps to understand the reach and level of security
provided by the existing solutions.
IX. HANDOVER SECURITY FOR SMART M-IoT

Handovers can be hard, soft, horizontal, vertical, terminal
and network controlled, and terminal and network-initiated,
as shown in Fig. 13. The handovers allow the shifting
of radios between the same or different media in a network. M-IoT devices undergo handoffs once they leave their
service-space and enter an area governed by a different entity.
Most of the handovers in M-IoT are vertical that require
efficient security measures for the protection of links during their switching [158], [307], [308]. There is a huge
requirement of trust as well as seamless shifting of services
across the terminals while performing handoffs and mobility management in the network [309], [310]. Usually, the
M-IoT networks focus on using an Access Point (AP), M-IoT
device, AS, and core terminals for shifting services across the
network [157]. Most of the networks require seamless services and faster authentication which can be obtained through
proactive mechanisms [311]. These proactive approaches
define a pre-determined system model over which the authentication is performed and verified against the attacker models.
Most of the approaches are selected on the basis of handoff
latency, and time consumed in laying off their services onto
the next terminals along with their cost of operations [312].
SDNs, media-independent technologies, network slicing and
the inclusion of PMIPv6-based solutions can enhance the
performance of security solutions that aim at securing the
handovers in M-IoT [146], [159], [313]–[316]. The proactive
and reactive handover authentication approaches can be further classified into initiation-based, architecture-based, and
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TABLE 9. State-of-the-art approaches for physical layer security in M-IoT.

property-based schemes for security in smart M-IoT. Note
that all of the handover authentication solutions may either
use primary, secondary or group mode for authentication
irrespective of the classification. The details are as follows:

a centralized authority [293]. However, security layouts
and architectural complexity can affect the performance
of such handovers.
B. ARCHITECTURE-BASED

A. INITIATION-BASED

Handovers are operated through a governing entity which
initiates the procedures of attachment and detachment of a
node in the network. Based on the initiation, the handovers
authentication procedures can be divided into the following
two types:
• Host-initiated: When the service consuming entity starts
the procedures of handovers, this type of handover is
marked as host-initiated. Host-initiated handovers consume much signalling and might have weak security
because of a failure in the identification of requests
which may come from an anomaly node [292].
• Network-initiated: When the service providing entity
starts the procedures of handovers, this type of handover
is marked as network-initiated. This type of handover is
low complex and more secure in because of control by
167148

As discussed earlier, the handovers authentication procedures
can also be studied from the architectural point of view and
can be distinguished into the following two types:
• Centralized: This includes the authentication procedures, which are driven by a centralized authority.
SDN-based or topology-based authentications are usually centralized in nature and consequently pose a risk
of a single point of failure [294]. Further, the centralized
layout increases the security path, which requires RO
approaches for increasing the performance.
• Distributed: This includes solutions like blockchainDMM, P2P, P2MP and crowdsourcing like authentications which can help to remove the dependencies on a
single entity in smart M-IoT [186], [293].
Moreover, location privacy is another factor to be considered for mobility of M-IoT. It helps to maintain the
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FIGURE 13. A broad classification of secure handover schemes for smart M-IoT.

anonymity of user location and its specifications. Considering the inclusion of location-based services in M-IoT,
use of location-privacy solutions helps to protect the system at the network as well as the user’s end [43],
[317], [318]. M-IoT can also be facilitated by using
location-privacy through obfuscation [319]. This will also
allow the extension of M-IoT to opportunistic scenarios.
Liao et al. [320] developed a trajectory-protecting solution, which supports location-based service privacy for
IoT-cloud systems. The authors rely on K-Anonymity Trajectory (KAT) algorithm, which shows low complex simulated results. Location-privacy can also be considered as
an additional metric for trust evaluation [321], [322]. Such
solutions are facilitated by hybrid security architectures and
uses different algorithms for different modules of the architecture. With the involvement of crowdsources in M-IoT,
location-privacy is a dominant metric to be considered for
protecting location-based threats and prevent issues related to
backward broadcasting or tunneling [323]–[325]. Especially,
for the inclusion of such solutions to M-IoT, it is desired to
developed novel key distribution and credential management
system that can elongate the efforts for location-based privacy
preservation.
C. PROPERTY-BASED

Handover authentication mechanisms can be classified on the
basis of property which governs their security aspects. These
include
• IP-based: This includes authentication mechanisms followed by the majority of mobile applications as it
uses proxy procedures to support the security of nodes
in smart M-IoT. PMIPv6 and F-PMIPv6 are among
the popular solutions for secure and seamless handovers [146], [157], [295], [296].
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•

•

•

Reliability-based: Approaches like [158], [297], which
not only provides strong authentication but also supports
the reliability of connections, are studied under this category. Such approaches help to sustain the connections
for longer duration without affecting compromising the
security considerations of the network.
Encryption-based: Authentication solutions, which
focus on using encryption-based solutions for security,
are studied under this type. Encryption based handovers
help to protect the user data as well as the control
information which is passed between the entities laying
off from a zone of one entity and moving into the zone
of other entity [146], [297], [298].
Uniform: Such types of handovers authentication are
more prominent in LTE and LTE-A networks as these
can be used for all types of networks [299], [300]. This is
one of the most suitable handovers procedures for smart
M-IoT networks. Such mechanisms are low-complex,
computationally-inexpensive and highly secure solutions for mobile security.
Media-Independent: Such types of handovers rely on the
security governed by IEEE 802.21a-2012 for supporting
security along with media independence while shifting
services from one entity to another in an inter-handover
mode [301], [302], [345], [346]. The amalgamation of
MIH solutions with F-PMIPv6 techniques is gaining
popularity because of their low complexity and high
security [159].

D. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS

In this section, we surveyed solutions for the secure handover
of smart M-IoT devices. The devices can perform intraor inter-handover depending on the layout of the network.
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TABLE 10. Proactive authentication mechanisms for secure handovers.

Proactive authentication plays a key role in securing service
layoffs between the devices and can ensure long-sessions
without disrupting the services of a user under movement.
Distributed security protocols play a considerable role in
managing nodes under high mobility scenarios by preventing unnecessary passes to the core for re-authentication of
devices.
Handoff latency, discovery time, bandwidth support,
mutual authentication, and overheads are some of the key
metrics to be considered for selecting an efficient handover scheme for M-IoT, as shown in Tables 10 and 11.
There are plenty of solutions which have diversified the
security aspects of handovers and provide a wide range of
services for handling billions of IoT devices. Despite this,
the majority of them fails on the aspect of performance
and does not account for the tradeoff between the security
and Quality of Experience (QoE). Thus, new approaches are
required that can take into account these requirements of
security as well as the performance before their final deployment and testing while causing minimum overheads during
handoffs.
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X. RESEARCH CHALLENGES, OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS

Security, privacy, and trust are supported through specific
requirements of a system, which are the open challenges
to be resolved in M-IoT. Most of the challenges and issues
can be acquired from the studies presented in [29]–[45],
[347]–[352]. From these studies, it is noticeable that the
major open issues to be resolved for M-IoT are:
• Satisfaction of the security requirements: It is of utmost
importance that any approach which aims to facilitate
security, privacy and trust in M-IoT must satisfy certain
security requirements that are listed below:
– Mutual Authentication: Security agreement between
each entity in M-IoT is of utmost importance. Each
device must be able to identify the correctness of
every other device involved in transmission. The
trust relationship between the devices can help to
attain the requirements of mutual authentication.
– Secure Key Exchange: Security keys are the pillar
for preventing attacks in a network. It is a must
that keys are exchanged secretly over a secure
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TABLE 11. Approaches for secure handovers in M-IoT.

channel and must not reveal at any instance of
operations.
– Session Key Management: This is a requirement
which helps to secure the communication between
the M-IoT devices. It is necessary for an approach
to use a secure key which is different from other
keys while communicating with a particular device
in a network. Session keys must be renewed consistently for preventing any attacks because of the lack
of key freshness.
– Perfect Forward Secrecy: In a communication
setup, capturing of long-term keys should not be
able to generate past session keys. This helps to
secure previous contents and also protect future
compromises and password sharing.
– Defense against a Replay Attack: Repetition of
valid data can reveal the security policies as well
as lead to overconsumption of resources in the
protection of the system. Such kinds of attacks
are caused by interceptions and must be avoided
as the traffic in M-IoT is very sensitive and
crucial.
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– Access Control and Authorization: It is required
that the new solutions are able to provide control
on the accessibility limits of each device and also
provide policies for authorization and management
of content along with session formations.
– Defense against a Resource Exhaustion Attack:
This type of attack should be prevented as resource
exhaustion attacks can exploit the network and the
M-IoT devices through excessive key operations.
Such an attack may lead to the shutdown of the
entire network.
Performance tradeoff: Apart from the security requirement, it is required that a solution should not compromise the performance of the system and must be capable
of handling the performance tradeoffs due to computational burden of security mechanisms. The approaches
must be able to handle the implementation-overheads
during continuous operations.
Platform compatibility: Due to a difference in the types
of devices and their configurations, it is difficult to
support platform compatibility in M-IoT. However, there
is still a strong requirement of such solutions which
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can be operated irrespective of the types of technologies
being operated over M-IoT devices. Platform compatibility can be obtained by defining security mechanisms
which rely on operations that have lesser variations
when shifted across devices.
• Resource utilization: Efficient utilization of resources
like memory and power and prevention of their overconsumption can save the operations up to a longer
duration. Resource utilization can be attained by using
novel network architectures as well as independent layers for each operation in M-IoT. Such a facility can be
obtained through SDN-NFV technologies. As discussed
earlier, facilities like osmotic computing, fog computing, catalytic computing and edge-crowd modelling can
be used for handling resource utilization while providing
security and privacy solutions for M-IoT.
• Insider threat management: Prevention of theft, fraud,
and damage through non-compromising models is
required as this can help to manage the false-occurrences
caused by the criminal aspects of M-IoT users. Models
like blockchain, distributed mobility management, and
crowdsourcing can be used for management of insider
threats in a system.
Future aspects of M-IoT are quite vast as it has to deal with
a lot of dependencies of the underlaid architecture. Network
designing and placement of components play a key role in
providing security in M-IoT; whereas privacy has a lot to do
with an individual as well as the service providers. Trust is
built on the backbone of security and privacy and its management is as crucial as other services. Till date, two of the major
aspects to achieve in trust management is its visualization
and formal way of expressing for a large set of users. Even
in the lights of different solutions, there are no standard
mechanisms which can help to visualize trust as a property
of a device. Thus, future approaches must consider formally
defining trust and building some standard rules which should
operate together with the security and privacy considerations
for enhancing the practicality of M-IoT services to users.
In lieu of various properties of existing solutions as discussed throughout this article, the following key points can
be used for directing further research on different aspects of
smart M-IoT.

•

•

•

A. SECURITY RELATED FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
•

Network Monitoring in M-IoT: M-IoT security relies on
the true operations of the entities involved in providing
services to the users. Any faulty equipment can result in
sets of failures which may compromise the operations
in M-IoT leading to the devastation of infrastructure as
well as data. Futuristic approaches must ensure efficient
deployment of solutions like IDS, network monitors,
and ethical packet sniffers for enhancing the security
requirements. Network monitoring should emphasize
the resource-based evaluation of the involved devices
so as to prevent service halts and offer ultra-reliable
QoE to its users. New tools can be developed which can
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analyze the traffic passes between the devices. In addition, the security of network monitors is to be considered for preventing any eavesdropping on the ethically
gathered data. Monitoring tools and procedures should
possess encapsulation as a key property and prevent and
disclosure of type and make of equipment even if the
attacker possesses maximum data [353], [354].
Vulnerability Assessment: For secure operations, it is of
utmost importance that the entire network is consistently
monitored for potential vulnerabilities that may lead to
different types of threats. Such a task can be attained by
defining security policies for each entity in the network
and building profilers which can help to assess devices
in case of weird behaviour or functioning [355]. Vulnerability assessment can help to determine the influence of attack on a particular set of entities [86]. The
vulnerability assessments should be conducted at both
the user-side and network-side. User-side evaluations
should be abstracted and must not consume excessive
operations and must be low on overheads; network-side
evaluations should be conducted with zero-maintenance
time and any service halts. Anomaly detection, community classification and attacker marking are the main
targets of vulnerability assessment [116]. All of these
are open issues and their applicability are subject to
application and operational scenarios.
Policies for Zero-day Attack: Zero-day attacks in software modules of M-IoT are the key threats to its security.
It is difficult to identify such possibilities unless made
public by the attacker. Most of these are identified during
the development stage, but some of these are marked
during the regular testing operations. It becomes the
liability of service providers and software-distributors
to provide security patches as soon as vulnerabilities
are identified. Further, providing customer knowledge
and making mandatory to download and install security
updates should be considered for effective countermeasures against such attacks [356]–[358].
Hacking and Accessibility: Despite always being a hot
topic, hacking and accessibility are yet open future challenges in smart M-IoT. It is required that new solutions
are developed for code obfuscation and new policies are
made for controlling the accessibility to M-IoT components and its services [359], [360]. Pre-authentication
mechanisms and multi-registration phases can help to
attain these requirements. However, performance and
overheads are the major issues attached to such provisioning, and any approach controlling the accessibility
must not cause performance overheads and should not
disturb the regular operations of the network.

B. PRIVACY RELATED FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
•

Prevention of Device Profiling: Data gathering is one
of the key requirements of modern-day organizations
to provide a personalized experience to their users.
However, the process of data gathering and information
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•

•

•

analysis may cause different types of threats by deliberately breaching the privacy of users. Collection of
data and using it for evaluating user behaviour and
controlling the preferences may allow a threat to confidentiality and integrity of an individual; further, hold
on information by an eavesdropper leads to vulnerable
conditions, which violates the network policies [361],
[362]. Thus, to overcome such issues, it is required
that futuristic solutions should not allow unauthorized
device profiling and information gathering procedures
must be controlled by the service providers. In addition,
no selling of data should be done as this violates the
personal space of an individual. Use of device profiling
for advertisements for generating revenues is fine, but it
should not affect the preferences of an individual.
Control over Data Gathering: M-IoT devices are sensitive to information and data across their network is
delicate to threats. Classification of data and generating knowledge by data-processing disclose different
types of vulnerabilities, which are the tools of hackers
for exploiting the network and its users. Approaches
are required that prohibits uncontrolled data gathering and limits the service providing apps from collecting excessive information other than the required
ones. Data gathering procedures should be controlled
by app hosting platforms and as per the individual is
concerned, they must be provided with knowledge of
using authenticated sources to prevent any enforced data
gatherings [191], [195].
Personalized Settings: Every application, be it open
source or proprietary, must provide preferential settings
to its users, where they can manage and control the
amount of information to be shared across the M-IoT
platforms. It is necessary that every user should be able
to monitor the amount of information and extend up to
which his/her information is used and for what purposes.
Personalized settings should be supported by access
management, accountability and authorization controls.
Managing Information Flow: For sufficiently high privacy settings, every entity in M-IoT must be provided
with facilities for managing information flow. These
information flows should be manageable remotely, thus,
different techniques and solutions can be developed for
such requirements which pave a way for controlling
the information flow even being present on-site. Development of toolkits and apps for information flow are
other future research challenges in smart M-IoT. Further,
these can be used with AI techniques to perform a priori
probabilistic checks on the occurrence of attacks for a
particular set of settings.

C. TRUST RELATED FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
•

Dedicated Node Management: Trust is a compliance
degree between the entities to ensure accurate operational behaviour in the network. M-IoT is dedicated
to operating networks which will heavily depend on
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the crowdsources for the majority of their operations.
Such a dependency raises a crucial requirement of node
management and control over the service-relationships
between the devices. Research must be conducted in this
direction while ensuring how the devices will interact
on the basis of what policies they can accurately judge
each others’ correctness [263], [264]. It is required that
certain solutions must be developed that can provide
dedicated node management at a fine granular level
while leveraging the properties of existing solutions for
trust management. Different type of protocols can be
designed that takes situational awareness as one of the
key properties for ensuring trust-aware communications
in M-IoT. In addition, contextual behaviour monitoring and aspect-based classification can help to ensure
trust-compliance between the entities of M-IoT.
Trust Visualization and Markings: There are a huge
set of applications and approaches which emphasize on
computing trust in different types of the network as per
the requirements of the applications. But the majority
of these fail to provide any conceptualization on the
visualization process which helps to easy identification
of service-law violators. It is required that research must
be conducted in this direction while finding a benchmark
which can be used as a backbone for trust-visualization
and markings [241]. In addition, facilities must be provided to check trust roles and authorization activities
across the network.
Anomaly Detection and Recovery: Anomaly detection
is the other key aspect of trust maintenance solutions.
Futuristic research must focus on providing enhanced,
on-demand and real-time facilities for detecting anomalies. This must accompany the solutions which can help
to recover the users which are marked as anomalies
by allowing them to re-justify their associations with
the networks’ terms and conditions and their flow control [116]. It is required that trust evaluations must lift
themselves from the traditional reputation-based systems as such facilities can easily fall prey to Sybil attacks
and may mislead the trust-maintenance process.
Distributed Evaluations and Trust offloading: Apart
from trust-management, the approaches are required
which can operate in a distributed manner and yet provide competitive results as that of centralized solutions.
This will help to prevent any single point of failure [143],
[241], [243], [265]. Such solutions can be fixated on
different offloading techniques which can be operated in
parallel to data evaluations and do not interfere with the
regular network operations. Development of distributed
IDS and crowd-sourced IDS can be crucial solutions
for attaining distributed evaluations as well as trust
offloading.

D. NECESSITY OF AMALGAMATION

Security, privacy, and trust in M-IoT go hand in hand.
A breach of policies of one may lead to attack through others.
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Security policies must be strong enough to prevent any unauthorized access to the personal information of an individual
in M-IoT and privacy policies must ensure that the data is
always shared with the trusted party. Such activity is also
operational in reverse and holds true for any sort of network
formations in smart M-IoT. The necessities for amalgamating
these solutions can be accounted for the following points:
• Prevention against Cyber Spies: Combining all the
aspects of security, privacy and trust for smart M-IoT
ensure protection against cyberbullies, spies, and service
breachers [90], [363], [364]. These three requirements
ensure that the network is operating in closed perimeter
even its operations are distributed across the huge cyber
network. Here, close perimeter refers to the path lengths
and routes which can be tracked down easily and conterminously without many overheads.
• Risk Assessment and Mitigation: A network should be
assessed for potential risks in its operations. It is necessary that the risk evaluations are conducted on the
basis of combined rules for security, privacy, and trust.
Risk evaluations are usually probabilistic, however, with
complete details of all possible rules, these can be used
for generating a particular output that yields visible
results for risk assessments [365]–[367].
• Reliable Communications: Modern network services,
especially the ones operating for smart M-IoT, require
reliable connections for their continuous operations.
Such a requirement can be ensured only if the network components and their services satisfy the requirements associated with security, privacy, and trust. In fact,
the upcoming applications in smart M-IoT not only
demand reliable communications, instead their focus
is on ultra-reliable communications [368], [369] with
lower dependencies and controlled cohesion and coupling amongst their software solutions.
Thus, it becomes inevitably important to develop solutions,
which hold true justifications for security, privacy, and trust
at the same instance and at the same level.
XI. CONCLUSION

Security solutions must be able to fortify authentication,
confidentiality, integrity, freshness, access control and authorizations for M-IoT devices and its platforms, whereas privacy must support information protection for every device
and its users. Both of these requisites can be obtained by
building trust relationships across the networks. However,
there exists a mixture of approaches that consider one of these
requisites but ignore the other requirements. Previous studies
have lighted such issues and withal compared the majority of
them on the substructure of different parameters. However,
prior studies have shown a constrained role in evaluating
security, privacy and trust especially for keenly intellective
and connected M-IoT networks. This paper considered the
shortcomings of existing literature and provided an in-depth
evaluation of different approaches which fixates on the crucial aspects of security, privacy, and trust.
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This article covered the concept and ideology of smart
M-IoT networks and its devices followed by their applications, advances, challenges, characteristics, technologies,
and standards. Then the literature evaluations were presented
for approaches which emphasized secure frameworks, dataprivacy, secure protocols, physical layer security, and handover protections for smart M-IoT. Next, different ways for
analyzing the security, privacy, and trust in M-IoT were
discussed followed by a roadmap and open issues along
with highlights of some pertinent materials which can be
followed for improving understandings in this direction of
research. This study has highlighted the requirements of new
solutions, which can collectively resolve the issues related to
security, privacy, and trust in smart M-IoT without compromising the performance and complexity of operations.
REFERENCES
[1] I. Farris, A. Orsino, L. Militano, A. Iera, and G. Araniti, ‘‘Federated IoT
services leveraging 5G technologies at the edge,’’ Ad Hoc Netw., vol. 68,
pp. 58–69, Jan. 2018.
[2] W. Liu, K. Nakauchi, and Y. Shoji, ‘‘A neighbor-based probabilistic
broadcast protocol for data dissemination in mobile IoT networks,’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 6, pp. 12260–12268, 2018.
[3] A. Ghasempour and T. K. Moon, ‘‘Optimizing the number of collectors
in machine-to-machine advanced metering infrastructure architecture for
Internet of Things-based smart grid,’’ in Proc. Green Technol. Conf.
(GreenTech), 2016, pp. 51–55.
[4] S. Misra and N. Saha, ‘‘Detour: Dynamic task offloading in softwaredefined fog for IoT applications,’’ IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 37,
no. 5, pp. 1159–1166, 2019.
[5] B. Afzal, M. Umair, G. A. Shah, and E. Ahmed, ‘‘Enabling IoT platforms
for social IoT applications: Vision, feature mapping, and challenges,’’
Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 92, pp. 718–731, Mar. 2019.
[6] Z. B. Celik, E. Fernandes, E. Pauley, G. Tan, and P. McDaniel, ‘‘Program analysis of commodity IoT applications for security and privacy:
Challenges and opportunities,’’ ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 52, no. 4, p. 74,
2019.
[7] S.-M. Cheng, P.-Y. Chen, C.-C. Lin, and H.-C. Hsiao, ‘‘Traffic-aware
patching for cyber security in mobile IoT,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55,
no. 7, pp. 29–35, Jul. 2017.
[8] S. K. Goudos, P. I. Dallas, S. Chatziefthymiou, and S. Kyriazakos, ‘‘A
survey of IoT key enabling and future technologies: 5G, mobile IoT,
sematic Web and applications,’’ Wireless Pers. Commun., vol. 97, no. 2,
pp. 1645–1675, 2017.
[9] A. Ghasempour, ‘‘Optimum number of aggregators based on power consumption, cost, and network lifetime in advanced metering infrastructure
architecture for smart grid Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. 13th IEEE Annu.
Consum. Commun. Netw. Conf. (CCNC), 2016, pp. 295–296.
[10] Low Power, Wide Area Networks (lpwan). Accessed: Sep. 2018. [Online].
Available: https://www.link-labs.com/blog/past-present-future-lpwan
[11] V. Sharma, I. You, G. Pau, M. Collotta, J. D. Lim, and J. N. Kim,
‘‘Lorawan-based energy-efficient surveillance by drones for intelligent
transportation systems,’’ Energies, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 573, 2018.
[12] F. Adelantado, X. Vilajosana, P. Tuset-Peiro, B. Martinez,
J. Melia-Segui, and T. Watteyne, ‘‘Understanding the limits of
LoRaWAN,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 34–40, Sep. 2017.
[13] P. Neumann, J. Montavont, and T. Noël, ‘‘Indoor deployment of lowpower wide area networks (LPWAN): A LoRaWAN case study,’’ in Proc.
12th Int. Conf. Wireless Mobile Comput., Netw. Commun. (WiMob), 2016,
pp. 1–8.
[14] J. Jermyn, R. P. Jover, I. Murynets, M. Istomin, and S. Stolfo, ‘‘Scalability
of machine to machine systems and the Internet of Things on LTE mobile
networks,’’ in Proc. 16th Int. Symp. World Wireless, Mobile Multimedia
Netw. (WoWMoM), 2015, pp. 1–9.
[15] R. P. Jover and I. Murynets, ‘‘Connection-less communication of IoT
devices over LTE mobile networks,’’ in Proc. 12th Annu. Int. Conf. Sens.,
Commun., Netw. (SECON), pp. 247–255, 2015.
VOLUME 8, 2020

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

[16] S. Chakrabarty, D. W. Engels, and S. Thathapudi, ‘‘Black SDN for the
Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. 12th Int. Conf. Mobile Ad Hoc Sensor Syst.
(MASS), 2015, pp. 190–198.
[17] M. Ojo, D. Adami, and S. Giordano, ‘‘A SDN-IoT architecture with NFV
implementation,’’ in Proc. Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps), 2016,
pp. 1–6.
[18] V. Sharma, F. Song, I. You, and H.-C. Chao, ‘‘Efficient management and
fast handovers in software defined wireless networks using UAVs,’’ IEEE
Netw., vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 78–85, Nov. 2017.
[19] Y. Bi, G. Han, S. Xu, X. Wang, C. Lin, Z. Yu, and P. Sun, ‘‘Software
defined space-terrestrial integrated networks: Architecture, challenges,
and solutions,’’ IEEE Netw., vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 22–28, Jan. 2019.
[20] A. Muthanna, A. A. Ateya, A. Khakimov, I. Gudkova, A. Abuarqoub,
K. Samouylov, and A. Koucheryavy, ‘‘Secure and reliable IoT networks
using fog computing with software-defined networking and blockchain,’’
J. Sensor Actuator Netw., vol. 8, no. 1, p. 15, Feb. 2019.
[21] H. Aksu, L. Babun, M. Conti, G. Tolomei, and A. S. Uluagac, ‘‘Advertising in the IoT era: Vision and challenges,’’ 2018, arXiv:1802.04102.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.04102
[22] M. Ammar, G. Russello, and B. Crispo, ‘‘Internet of Things: A survey on
the security of IoT frameworks,’’ J. Inf. Secur. Appl., vol. 38, pp. 8–27,
Feb. 2018.
[23] Y.-W. Sawng, H.-W. Kim, S.-J. Lee, and J.-W. Choi, ‘‘Technology forecasting of IoT healthcare with big data analysis,’’ in Proc. ICCC Soc.
Korea, 2017, pp. 89–90.
[24] A. Ghasempour, ‘‘Optimized scalable decentralized hybrid advanced
metering infrastructure for smart grid,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Smart Grid
Commun. (SmartGridComm), 2015, pp. 223–228.
[25] A. Ghasempour, ‘‘Optimum packet service and arrival rates in advanced
metering infrastructure architecture of smart grid,’’ in Proc. Green Technol. Conf. (GreenTech), Apr. 2016, pp. 1–5.
[26] A. Ghasempour, ‘‘Optimized advanced metering infrastructure architecture of smart grid based on total cost, energy, and delay,’’ in Proc. IEEE
Power Energy Soc. Innov. Smart Grid Technol. Conf. (ISGT), Sep. 2016,
pp. 1–6.
[27] A. Chasempour, ‘‘Optimizing the advanced metering infrastructure architecture in smart grid,’’ Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. Elect. Eng., Utah State
Univ., Logan, UT, USA, 2016, vol. 5023.
[28] V. Sharma, F. Song, I. You, and M. Atiquzzaman, ‘‘Energy efficient device
discovery for reliable communication in 5G-based IoT and BSNs using
unmanned aerial vehicles,’’ J. Netw. Comput. Appl., vol. 97, pp. 79–95,
Nov. 2017.
[29] C. M. Medaglia and A. Serbanati, ‘‘An overview of privacy and security
issues in the Internet of Things,’’ in The Internet of Things. New York,
NY, USA: Springer, 2010, pp. 389–395.
[30] G. M. Køien, ‘‘Reflections on trust in devices: An informal survey of
human trust in an Internet-of-Things context,’’ Wireless Pers. Commun.,
vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 495–510, Dec. 2011.
[31] R. Bonetto, N. Bui, V. Lakkundi, A. Olivereau, A. Serbanati, and
M. Rossi, ‘‘Secure communication for smart IoT objects: Protocol stacks,
use cases and practical examples,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. World
Wireless, Mobile Multimedia Netw. (WoWMoM), Jun. 2012, pp. 1–7.
[32] K.-D. Chang and J.-L. Chen, ‘‘A survey of trust management in WSNs,
Internet of Things and future Internet,’’ KSII Trans. Internet Inf. Syst.,
vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 5–23, 2012.
[33] T. Bhattasali, R. Chaki, and N. Chaki, ‘‘Study of security issues in pervasive environment of next generation Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. Comput.
Inf. Syst. Ind. Manage. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2013, pp. 206–217.
[34] R. Roman, J. Zhou, and J. Lopez, ‘‘On the features and challenges of
security and privacy in distributed Internet of Things,’’ Comput. Netw.,
vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 2266–2279, Jul. 2013.
[35] Z. Yan, P. Zhang, and A. V. Vasilakos, ‘‘A survey on trust management
for Internet of Things,’’ J. Netw. Comput. Appl., vol. 42, pp. 120–134,
Jun. 2014.
[36] Q. Jing, A. V. Vasilakos, J. Wan, J. Lu, and D. Qiu, ‘‘Security of the
Internet of Things: Perspectives and challenges,’’ Wireless Netw., vol. 20,
no. 8, pp. 2481–2501, 2014.
[37] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L. A. Grieco, and A. Coen-Porisini, ‘‘Security,
privacy and trust in Internet of Things: The road ahead,’’ Comput. Netw.,
vol. 76, pp. 146–164, Jan. 2015.
[38] O. Arias, J. Wurm, K. Hoang, and Y. Jin, ‘‘Privacy and security in Internet
of Things and wearable devices,’’ IEEE Trans. Multi-Scale Comput. Syst.,
vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 99–109, Apr. 2015.
VOLUME 8, 2020

[39] L. Malina, J. Hajny, R. Fujdiak, and J. Hosek, ‘‘On perspective of security
and privacy-preserving solutions in the Internet of Things,’’ Comput.
Netw., vol. 102, pp. 83–95, Jun. 2016.
[40] S. Li, T. Tryfonas, and H. Li, ‘‘The Internet of Things: A security point
of view,’’ Internet Res., vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 337–359, Apr. 2016.
[41] J. Zhou, Z. Cao, X. Dong, and A. V. Vasilakos, ‘‘Security and privacy
for cloud-based IoT: Challenges,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 1,
pp. 26–33, Jan. 2017.
[42] Y. Yang, L. Wu, G. Yin, L. Li, and H. Zhao, ‘‘A survey on security and
privacy issues in Internet-of-Things,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 4,
no. 5, pp. 1250–1258, Oct. 2017.
[43] L. Chen, S. Thombre, K. Järvinen, E. S. Lohan, A. Alén-Savikko,
H. Leppäkoski, M. Z. H. Bhuiyan, S. Bu-Pasha, G. N. Ferrara, S. Honkala,
J. Lindqvist, L. Ruotsalainen, P. Korpisaari, and H. Kuusniemi, ‘‘Robustness, security and privacy in location-based services for future IoT: A
survey,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 8956–8977, 2017.
[44] W. Feng, Z. Yan, H. Zhang, K. Zeng, Y. Xiao, and Y. T. Hou, ‘‘A survey
on security, privacy, and trust in mobile crowdsourcing,’’ IEEE Internet
Things J., vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 2971–2992, Aug. 2018.
[45] K. Yang, D. Blaauw, and D. Sylvester, ‘‘Hardware designs for security
in ultra-low-power IoT systems: An overview and survey,’’ IEEE Micro,
vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 72–89, Nov. 2017.
[46] S. Sen, J. Koo, and S. Bagchi, ‘‘TRIFECTA: Security, energy efficiency,
and communication capacity comparison for wireless IoT devices,’’ IEEE
Internet Comput., vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 74–81, Jan. 2018.
[47] X. Tang, P. Ren, and Z. Han, ‘‘Jamming mitigation via hierarchical security game for IoT communications,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 5766–5779,
2018.
[48] B. L. Parne, S. Gupta, and N. S. Chaudhari, ‘‘SEGB: Security enhanced
group based AKA protocol for M2M communication in an IoT enabled
LTE/LTE-A network,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 3668–3684, 2018.
[49] N.-N. Dao, Y. Kim, S. Jeong, M. Park, and S. Cho, ‘‘Achievable multisecurity levels for lightweight IoT-enabled devices in infrastructureless
peer-aware communications,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 26743–26753,
2017.
[50] M. Mangia, F. Pareschi, R. Rovatti, and G. Setti, ‘‘Low-cost security of
IoT sensor nodes with rakeness-based compressed sensing: Statistical and
known-plaintext attacks,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 13,
no. 2, pp. 327–340, Feb. 2018.
[51] J. Wang, Z. Hong, Y. Zhang, and Y. Jin, ‘‘Enabling security-enhanced
attestation with Intel SGX for remote terminal and IoT,’’ IEEE Trans.
Comput.-Aided Design Integr. Circuits Syst., vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 88–96,
Jan. 2018.
[52] H. Sedjelmaci, S. M. Senouci, and T. Taleb, ‘‘An accurate security game
for low-resource IoT devices,’’ IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 66, no. 10,
pp. 9381–9393, Oct. 2017.
[53] R. Giuliano, F. Mazzenga, A. Neri, and A. M. Vegni, ‘‘Security access
protocols in IoT capillary networks,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 4,
no. 3, pp. 645–657, Jun. 2017.
[54] W. Yu and S. Köse, ‘‘A lightweight masked AES implementation for
securing IoT against CPA attacks,’’ IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. I, Reg.
Papers, vol. 64, no. 11, pp. 2934–2944, Nov. 2017.
[55] T. Ulz, T. Pieber, A. Höller, S. Haas, and C. Steger, ‘‘Secured and easyto-use NFC-based device configuration for the Internet of Things,’’ IEEE
J. Radio Freq. Identificat., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 75–84, Mar. 2017.
[56] G. Xu, Y. Cao, Y. Ren, X. Li, and Z. Feng, ‘‘Network security situation
awareness based on semantic ontology and user-defined rules for Internet
of Things,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 21046–21056, 2017.
[57] E. Luo, M. Z. A. Bhuiyan, G. Wang, M. A. Rahman, J. Wu, and
M. Atiquzzaman, ‘‘PrivacyProtector: Privacy-protected patient data collection in IoT-based healthcare systems,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 56,
no. 2, pp. 163–168, Feb. 2018.
[58] A. Ghasempour and J. H. Gunther, ‘‘Finding the optimal number of aggregators in machine-to-machine advanced metering infrastructure architecture of smart grid based on cost, delay, and energy consumption,’’ in Proc.
13th Annu. Consum. Commun. Netw. Conf. (CCNC), 2016, pp. 960–963.
[59] IoT Standards and Protocols. Accessed: Sep. 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.postscapes.com/Internet-of-Things-protocols/
[60] GSMA IoT Security Guidelines. Accessed: Sep. 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.gsma.com/IoT/IoT-security/IoT-security-guidelines/
[61] V. Sharma, K. Lee, S. Kwon, J. Kim, H. Park, K. Yim, and S.-Y. Lee,
‘‘A consensus framework for reliability and mitigation of zero-day attacks
in IoT,’’ Secur. Commun. Netw., vol. 2017, pp. 1–24, Nov. 2017.
167155

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

[62] F. Kammüller, M. Kerber, and C. W. Probst, ‘‘Insider threats and auctions: Formalization, mechanized proof, and code generation,’’ J. Wireless
Mobile Netw., Ubiquitous Comput., Dependable Appl., vol. 8, no. 1,
pp. 44–78, 2017.
[63] V. Sharma, I. You, and G. Kul, ‘‘Socializing drones for inter-service
operability in ultra-dense wireless networks using blockchain,’’ in Proc.
Int. Workshop Manag. Insider Secur. Threats, 2017, pp. 81–84.
[64] G. Li, H. Zhou, G. Li, and B. Feng, ‘‘Application-aware and dynamic
security function chaining for mobile networks,’’ J. Internet Services Inf.
Secur., vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 21–34, 2017.
[65] V. Sharma, I. You, and R. Kumar, ‘‘ISMA: Intelligent sensing model for
anomalies detection in cross platform OSNs with a case study on IoT,’’
IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 3284–3301, 2017.
[66] K. Mekki, E. Bajic, F. Chaxel, and F. Meyer, ‘‘A comparative study of
LPWAN technologies for large-scale IoT deployment,’’ ICT Exp., vol. 5,
no. 1, pp. 1–7, Mar. 2019.
[67] J. Petäjäjärvi, K. Mikhaylov, M. Hämäläinen, and J. Iinatti, ‘‘Evaluation
of LoRa LPWAN technology for remote health and wellbeing monitoring,’’ in Proc. 10th Int. Symp. Med. Inf. Commun. Technol. (ISMICT),
Mar. 2016, pp. 1–5.
[68] Z. Shelby and C. Bormann, 6LoWPAN: The Wireless Embedded Internet,
vol. 43. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2011.
[69] C. A. Trasviña-Moreno, R. Blasco, R. Casas, and A. Asensio, ‘‘A network
performance analysis of LoRa modulation for LPWAN sensor devices,’’
in Ubiquitous Computing and Ambient Intelligence. Cham, Switzerland:
Springer, 2016, pp. 174–181.
[70] R. Ratasuk, B. Vejlgaard, N. Mangalvedhe, and A. Ghosh, ‘‘NB-IoT
system for M2M communication,’’ in Proc. Wireless Commun. Netw.
Conf. Workshops (WCNCW), Apr. 2016, pp. 1–5.
[71] Standards. Accessed: Mar. 10, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://standards.
ieee.org/innovate/IoT/stds.html
[72] IoT Standards and Protocols. Accessed: Mar. 10, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.postscapes.com/Internet-of-Things-protocols/
[73] M. R. Palattella, N. Accettura, X. Vilajosana, T. Watteyne, L. A. Grieco,
G. Boggia, and M. Dohler, ‘‘Standardized protocol stack for the Internet
of (important) things,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 15, no. 3,
pp. 1389–1406, 3rd Quart., 2013.
[74] IBM-Watson IoT. Accessed: Sep. 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://developer.ibm.com/IoTplatform/
[75] Microsoft Azure IoT Suite. Accessed: Sep. 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Internet-of-Things
[76] OpenIoT. Accessed: Sep. 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.
openIoT.eu/
[77] OCF. Accessed: Sep. 2018. [Online]. Available: https://openconnectivity.
org/
[78] Y. Amit, R. Hay, R. Saltzman, and A. Sharabani, ‘‘Pinpointing security
vulnerabilities in computer software applications,’’ U.S. Patent 8 510 842,
Aug. 13, 2013.
[79] O. H. Alhazmi, Y. K. Malaiya, and I. Ray, ‘‘Measuring, analyzing and
predicting security vulnerabilities in software systems,’’ Comput. Secur.,
vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 219–228, May 2007.
[80] K. Benton, L. J. Camp, and C. Small, ‘‘OpenFlow vulnerability assessment,’’ in Proc. 2nd ACM SIGCOMM workshop Hot Topics Softw.
Defined Netw., 2013, pp. 151–152.
[81] Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). Accessed: Oct. 2018.
[Online]. Available: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page
[82] K. Peguero, N. Zhang, and X. Cheng, ‘‘An empirical study of the framework impact on the security of JavaScript Web applications,’’ in Proc.
Companion The Web Conf. Web Conf., 2018, pp. 753–758.
[83] Y. Fang, Y. Li, L. Liu, and C. Huang, ‘‘DeepXSS: Cross site scripting
detection based on deep learning,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Comput. Artif.
Intell., 2018, pp. 47–51.
[84] D. Sagar, S. Kukreja, J. Brahma, S. Tyagi, and P. Jain, ‘‘Studying open
source vulnerability scanners for vulnerabilities in Web applications,’’
IIOAB J., vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 43–49, 2018.
[85] G. Lancioni, S. Hunt, and M. D. Wood, ‘‘Method and system to accelerate
IoT patch propagation and reduce security vulnerabilities exposure time,’’
U.S. Patent 15 476 219, Oct. 4, 2018.
[86] S. Samtani, S. Yu, H. Zhu, M. Patton, J. Matherly, and H. Chen, ‘‘Identifying supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices and their
vulnerabilities on the Internet of Things (IoT): A text mining approach,’’
IEEE Intell. Syst., vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 63–73, Sep. 2020.
167156

[87] V. Sharma, G. Choudhary, Y. Ko, and I. You, ‘‘Behavior and vulnerability
assessment of drones-enabled industrial Internet of Things (IIoT),’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 6, pp. 43368–43383, 2018.
[88] K. Kim, J. Lee, and W. Jung, ‘‘Method of building a security vulnerability
information collection and management system for analyzing the security
vulnerabilities of IoT devices,’’ in Advanced Multimedia and Ubiquitous
Engineering. Singapore: Springer, 2017, pp. 205–210.
[89] M. Frustaci, P. Pace, G. Aloi, and G. Fortino, ‘‘Evaluating critical security
issues of the IoT world: Present and future challenges,’’ IEEE Internet
Things J., vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 2483–2495, Aug. 2018.
[90] K. Kim, I. Kim, and J. Lim, ‘‘National cyber security enhancement
scheme for intelligent surveillance capacity with public IoT environment,’’ J. Supercomput., vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 1140–1151, Mar. 2017.
[91] I. Stellios, P. Kotzanikolaou, M. Psarakis, C. Alcaraz, and J. Lopez, ‘‘A
survey of IoT-enabled cyberattacks: Assessing attack paths to critical
infrastructures and services,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 20, no. 4,
pp. 3453–3495, 4th Quart., 2018.
[92] W. Xie, Y. Jiang, Y. Tang, N. Ding, and Y. Gao, ‘‘Vulnerability detection
in IoT firmware: A survey,’’ in Proc. IEEE 23rd Int. Conf. Parallel Distrib.
Syst. (ICPADS), Dec. 2017, pp. 769–772.
[93] Z. Huang, S. Liu, X. Mao, K. Chen, and J. Li, ‘‘Insight of the protection
for data security under selective opening attacks,’’ Inf. Sci., vols. 412–413,
pp. 223–241, Oct. 2017.
[94] J. Li, J. Li, D. Xie, and Z. Cai, ‘‘Secure auditing and deduplicating data in
cloud,’’ IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 2386–2396, Aug. 2016.
[95] P. Li, J. Li, Z. Huang, C.-Z. Gao, W.-B. Chen, and K. Chen, ‘‘Privacypreserving outsourced classification in cloud computing,’’ Cluster Comput., vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 277–286, 2017.
[96] C. Dsouza, G.-J. Ahn, and M. Taguinod, ‘‘Policy-driven security management for fog computing: Preliminary framework and a case study,’’ in
Proc. IEEE 15th Int. Conf. Inf. Reuse Integr. (IRI), Aug. 2014, pp. 16–23.
[97] S. Cirani, M. Picone, P. Gonizzi, L. Veltri, and G. Ferrari, ‘‘IoT-OAS: An
OAuth-based authorization service architecture for secure services in IoT
scenarios,’’ IEEE Sensors J., vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 1224–1234, Feb. 2015.
[98] K. S. Sahoo, B. Sahoo, and A. Panda, ‘‘A secured SDN framework for
IoT,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Man Mach. Interfacing (MAMI), Dec. 2015,
pp. 1–4.
[99] J. Pacheco, S. Satam, S. Hariri, C. Grijalva, and H. Berkenbrock, ‘‘IoT
security development framework for building trustworthy smart car services,’’ in Proc. IEEE Conf. Intell. Secur. Informat. (ISI), Sep. 2016,
pp. 237–242.
[100] P. P. Pereira, J. Eliasson, and J. Delsing, ‘‘An authentication and access
control framework for CoAP-based Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. IECON
40th Annu. Conf. IEEE Ind. Electron. Soc., Oct. 2014, pp. 5293–5299.
[101] C. Gonzalez, S. M. Charfadine, O. Flauzac, and F. Nolot, ‘‘SDN-based
security framework for the IoT in distributed grid,’’ in Proc. Int. Multidisciplinary Conf. Comput. Energy Sci. (SpliTech), Jul. 2016, pp. 1–5.
[102] L. Seitz, G. Selander, and C. Gehrmann, ‘‘Authorization framework for
the Internet-of-Things,’’ in Proc. IEEE 14th Int. Symp. ‘World Wireless,
Mobile Multimedia Netw.’ (WoWMoM), Jun. 2013, pp. 1–6.
[103] J. L. Hernández-Ramos, M. V. Moreno, J. B. Bernabé, D. G. Carrillo,
and A. F. Skarmeta, ‘‘SAFIR: Secure access framework for IoT-enabled
services on smart buildings,’’ J. Comput. Syst. Sci., vol. 81, no. 8,
pp. 1452–1463, Dec. 2015.
[104] A. Guchhait, M. B, and K. D, ‘‘A hybrid V2V system for collision-free
high-speed Internet access in intelligent transportation system,’’ Trans.
Emerg. Telecommun. Technol., vol. 29, no. 3, p. e3282, Mar. 2018.
[105] N. Dagdee and R. Vijaywargiya, ‘‘Credential based hybrid access control
methodology for shared electronic health records,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Inf.
Manage. Eng., 2009, pp. 624–628.
[106] H. Abie and I. Balasingham, ‘‘Risk-based adaptive security for smart
IoT in eHealth,’’ in Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Body Area Netw. (ICST), 2012,
pp. 269–275.
[107] M. Ge and D. S. Kim, ‘‘A framework for modeling and assessing security
of the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. 21st Int. Conf. Parallel Distrib. Syst.
(ICPADS), 2015, pp. 776–781.
[108] B. R. Ray, J. Abawajy, and M. Chowdhury, ‘‘Scalable RFID security
framework and protocol supporting Internet of Things,’’ Comput. Netw.,
vol. 67, pp. 89–103, Jul. 2014.
[109] V. R. Kebande and I. Ray, ‘‘A generic digital forensic investigation
framework for Internet of Things (IoT),’’ in Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Future
Internet Things Cloud (FiCloud), Aug. 2016, pp. 356–362.
VOLUME 8, 2020

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

[110] Q. Wang and S. Sawhney, ‘‘VeCure: A practical security framework to
protect the CAN bus of vehicles,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Internet Things
(IoT), Oct. 2014, pp. 13–18.
[111] X. Huang, P. Craig, H. Lin, and Z. Yan, ‘‘SecIoT: A security framework for the Internet of Things,’’ Secur. Commun. Netw., vol. 9, no. 16,
pp. 3083–3094, Nov. 2016.
[112] J. G. Mclachlan, A. J. Farrugia, and N. T. Sullivan, ‘‘Adaptive secondary
authentication criteria based on account data,’’ U.S. Patent 9 043 887,
May 26, 2015.
[113] M. Tao, J. Zuo, Z. Liu, A. Castiglione, and F. Palmieri, ‘‘Multi-layer
cloud architectural model and ontology-based security service framework for IoT-based smart homes,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 78,
pp. 1040–1051, Jan. 2018.
[114] A. F. A. Rahman, M. Daud, and M. Z. Mohamad, ‘‘Securing sensor to
cloud ecosystem using Internet of Things (IoT) security framework,’’ in
Proc. Int. Conf. Internet Things Cloud Comput., 2016, p. 79.
[115] S. Ahmad, A. Lavin, S. Purdy, and Z. Agha, ‘‘Unsupervised realtime anomaly detection for streaming data,’’ Neurocomputing, vol. 262,
pp. 134–147, Nov. 2017.
[116] V. Sharma, R. Kumar, W.-H. Cheng, M. Atiquzzaman, K. Srinivasan, and
A. Y. Zomaya, ‘‘NHAD: Neuro-fuzzy based horizontal anomaly detection
in online social networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 30, no. 11,
pp. 2171–2184, Nov. 2018.
[117] M. Toledano, I. Cohen, Y. Ben-Simhon, and I. Tadeski, ‘‘Real-time
anomaly detection system for time series at scale,’’ in Proc. KDDWorkshop Anomaly Detection Finance, 2018, pp. 56–65.
[118] M. Ahmed and A. N. Mahmood, ‘‘Network traffic pattern analysis using
improved information theoretic co-clustering based collective anomaly
detection,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Secur. Privacy Commun. Syst. Cham,
Switzerland: Springer, 2014, pp. 204–219.
[119] D. Monniaux, ‘‘Decision procedures for the analysis of cryptographic
protocols by logics of belief,’’ in Proc. 12th IEEE Comput. Secur. Found.
Workshop, 1999, pp. 44–54.
[120] M. Cohen and M. Dam, ‘‘Logical omniscience in the semantics of ban
logic,’’ in Proc. Found. Comput. Secur., 2005, pp. 121–132.
[121] S. Matsuo, K. Miyazaki, A. Otsuka, and D. Basin, ‘‘How to evaluate the security of real-life cryptographic protocols?’’ in Proc. Int.
Conf. Financial Cryptogr. Data Secur. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2010,
pp. 182–194.
[122] G. Bleumer, ‘‘Random oracle model,’’ in Encyclopedia of Cryptography
and Security. New York, NY, USA: Springer, 2011, pp. 1027–1028.
[123] W. Mao, Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice. Upper Saddle
River, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, 2003.
[124] L. C. Paulson, ‘‘Inductive analysis of the Internet protocol TLS,’’ ACM
Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 332–351, Aug. 1999.
[125] A. Armando, D. Basin, Y. Boichut, Y. Chevalier, L. Compagna,
J. Cuellar, P. H. Drielsma, P. C. Heám, O. Kouchnarenko, J. Mantovani,
S. Mödersheim, D. von Oheimb, M. Rusinowitch, J. Santiago,
M. Turuani, L. Viganò, L. Vigneron, ‘‘The AVISPA tool for the
automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications,’’ in
Proc. Int. Conf. Comput. Aided Verification. Berlin, Germany: Springer,
2005, pp. 281–285.
[126] M. Kaufmann, P. Manolios, and J. S. Moore, Computer-Aided Reasoning:
ACL2 Case Studies, vol. 4. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2013.
[127] R. Küsters and T. Truderung, ‘‘Using ProVerif to analyze protocols with
Diffie-Hellman exponentiation,’’ in Proc. 22nd Comput. Secur. Found.
Symp. (CSF), Jul. 2009, pp. 157–171.
[128] C. J. Cremers, ‘‘The Scyther tool: Verification, falsification, and analysis
of security protocols,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Comput. Aided Verification.
Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2008, pp. 414–418.
[129] P. Urien, ‘‘LLCPS: A new security framework based on TLS for NFC
P2P applications in the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. IEEE 10th Consum.
Commun. Netw. Conf. (CCNC), Jan. 2013, pp. 845–846.
[130] K. C. Park and D.-H. Shin, ‘‘Security assessment framework for IoT
service,’’ Telecommun. Syst., vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 193–209, Jan. 2017.
[131] C. Ma, S. Kulshrestha, W. Shi, Y. Okada, and R. Bose, ‘‘E-learning
material development framework supporting VR/AR based on linked data
for IoT security education,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Emerg. Internetwork.,
Data Web Technol. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018, pp. 479–491.
[132] S. Siboni, A. Shabtai, N. O. Tippenhauer, J. Lee, and Y. Elovici,
‘‘Advanced security testbed framework for wearable IoT devices,’’ ACM
Trans. Internet Technol., vol. 16, no. 4, p. 26, 2016.
[133] H. Ning and H. Liu, ‘‘Cyber-physical-social based security architecture
for future Internet of Things,’’ Adv. Internet Things, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–7,
2012.
VOLUME 8, 2020

[134] J. B. Bernabe, J. L. Hernández, M. V. Moreno, and A. F. S. Gomez,
‘‘Privacy-preserving security framework for a social-aware Internet of
Things,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Ubiquitous Comput. Ambient Intell. Cham,
Switzerland: Springer, 2014, pp. 408–415.
[135] D. Lake, R. Milito, M. Morrow, and R. Vargheese, ‘‘Internet of Things:
Architectural framework for eHealth security,’’ J. ICT Standardization,
vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 301–328, 2014.
[136] F. Wang, B. Ge, L. Zhang, Y. Chen, Y. Xin, and X. Li, ‘‘A system
framework of security management in enterprise systems,’’ Syst. Res.
Behav. Sci., vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 287–299, May 2013.
[137] F. Olivier, G. Carlos, and N. Florent, ‘‘New security architecture for IoT
network,’’ Procedia Comput. Sci., vol. 52, pp. 1028–1033, 2015.
[138] H. Shafagh and A. Hithnawi, ‘‘Security comes first, a public-key cryptography framework for the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
Distrib. Comput. Sensor Syst. (DCOSS), May 2014, pp. 135–136.
[139] P. Kasinathan, G. Costamagna, H. Khaleel, C. Pastrone, and
M. A. Spirito, ‘‘An IDS framework for Internet of Things empowered
by 6LoWPAN,’’ in Proc. ACM SIGSAC Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur.,
2013, pp. 1337–1340.
[140] O. Flauzac, C. Gonzalez, A. Hachani, and F. Nolot, ‘‘SDN based architecture for IoT and improvement of the security,’’ in Proc. 29th Int. Conf.
Adv. Inf. Netw. Appl. Workshops (WAINA), 2015, pp. 688–693.
[141] V. K. Sehgal, A. Patrick, A. Soni, and L. Rajput, ‘‘Smart human security framework using Internet of Things, cloud and fog computing,’’ in
Intelligent Distributed Computing. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015,
pp. 251–263.
[142] M. Gharibi, R. Boutaba, and S. L. Waslander, ‘‘Internet of drones,’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 4, pp. 1148–1162, 2016.
[143] V. Sharma, K. Srinivasan, D. N. K. Jayakody, O. Rana, and R. Kumar,
‘‘Managing service-heterogeneity using osmotic computing,’’ 2017,
arXiv:1704.04213. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.04213
[144] V. Sharma, I. You, and R. Kumar, ‘‘Resource-based mobility management
for video users in 5G using catalytic computing,’’ Comput. Commun.,
vol. 118, pp. 120–139, Mar. 2018.
[145] J. Li, Y. Zhang, X. Chen, and Y. Xiang, ‘‘Secure attribute-based data
sharing for resource-limited users in cloud computing,’’ Comput. Secur.,
vol. 72, pp. 1–12, Jan. 2018.
[146] D. Shin, V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, and I. You, ‘‘Secure and efficient
protocol for route optimization in PMIPv6-based smart home IoT networks,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 11100–11117, 2017.
[147] V. Sharma, I. You, D. N. K. Jayakody, and M. Atiquzzaman, ‘‘Cooperative
trust relaying and privacy preservation via edge-crowdsourcing in social
Internet of Things,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 92, pp. 758–776,
Mar. 2019.
[148] C. Deepa and B. Latha, ‘‘HHSRP: A cluster based hybrid hierarchical
secure routing protocol for wireless sensor networks,’’ Cluster Comput.,
pp. 1–17, Jul. 2017.
[149] S. Ullah, M. Imran, and M. Alnuem, ‘‘A hybrid and secure priorityguaranteed MAC protocol for wireless body area network,’’ Int. J. Distrib.
Sensor Netw., vol. 10, no. 2, Feb. 2014, Art. no. 481761.
[150] Y. Yang and S. Roy, ‘‘Secure MAC protocol for periodic smart metering data communication with compressive sensing,’’ in Proc. Globecom
Workshops (GC Wkshps), Dec. 2016, pp. 1–6.
[151] N. Li, J.-F. Martinez-Ortega, and V. Hernandez Diaz, ‘‘Cross-layer
balanced and reliable opportunistic routing algorithm for mobile
ad hoc networks,’’ 2017, arXiv:1710.00105. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.00105
[152] J. K. Vinayagam, C. H. Balaswamy, and K. Soundararajan, ‘‘Adopting cross layer approach for detecting and segregating malicious nodes
in MANET,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Signal Process. Commun. (ICSPC),
Jul. 2017, pp. 457–461.
[153] S. Adibi, ‘‘A novel energy-efficient cross-application-layer platform with
QoS-security support,’’ Int. J. Commun. Syst., vol. 30, no. 2, p. e2940,
Jan. 2017.
[154] P. L. R. Chze and K. S. Leong, ‘‘A secure multi-hop routing for IoT communication,’’ in Proc. World Forum Internet Things (WF-IoT), Mar. 2014,
pp. 428–432.
[155] S. Raza, T. Voigt, and V. Jutvik, ‘‘Lightweight IKEv2: A key management
solution for both the compressed IPsec and the IEEE 802.15. 4 security,’’
in Proc. IETF Workshop Object Secur., vol. 23, pp. 1–2, 2012.
[156] R. Hummen, H. Wirtz, J. H. Ziegeldorf, J. Hiller, and K. Wehrle, ‘‘Tailoring end-to-end IP security protocols to the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc.
21st IEEE Int. Conf. Netw. Protocols (ICNP), Oct. 2013, pp. 1–10.
167157

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

[157] I. You and J.-H. Lee, ‘‘SPFP: Ticket-based secure handover for fast proxy
mobile IPv6 in 5G networks,’’ Comput. Netw., vol. 129, pp. 363–372,
Dec. 2017.
[158] V. Sharma, I. You, F.-Y. Leu, and M. Atiquzzaman, ‘‘Secure and efficient
protocol for fast handover in 5G mobile xhaul networks,’’ J. Netw. Comput. Appl., vol. 102, pp. 38–57, Jan. 2018.
[159] J. Guan, V. Sharma, I. You, and M. Atiquzzaman, ‘‘Extension of MIH
to support FPMIPv6 for optimized heterogeneous handover,’’ 2017,
arXiv:1705.09835. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.09835
[160] L. Xu, Y. He, X. Chen, and X. Huang, ‘‘Ticket-based handoff authentication for wireless mesh networks,’’ Comput. Netw., vol. 73, pp. 185–194,
Nov. 2014.
[161] P. Yadav and M. Hussain, ‘‘A secure AODV routing protocol with node
authentication,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Electron., Commun. Aerosp. Technol.
(ICECA), vol. 1, Apr. 2017, pp. 489–493.
[162] K. D. Kang, ‘‘A practical and lightweight source authentication protocol
using one-way hash chain in CAN,’’ Ph.D. dissertation, Inf. Commun.
Eng., DGIST, Daegu, Republic of Korea, 2017.
[163] T. Kothmayr, C. Schmitt, W. Hu, M. Brünig, and G. Carle, ‘‘DTLS based
security and two-way authentication for the Internet of Things,’’ Ad Hoc
Netw., vol. 11, no. 8, pp. 2710–2723, Nov. 2013.
[164] P. Porambage, C. Schmitt, P. Kumar, A. Gurtov, and M. Ylianttila,
‘‘Two-phase authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks in distributed IoT applications,’’ in Proc. IEEE Wireless Commun. Netw. Conf.
(WCNC), Apr. 2014, pp. 2728–2733.
[165] R. Amin, N. Kumar, G. P. Biswas, R. Iqbal, and V. Chang, ‘‘A light
weight authentication protocol for IoT-enabled devices in distributed
cloud computing environment,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 78,
pp. 1005–1019, Jan. 2018.
[166] P. Gope, R. Amin, S. K. Hafizul Islam, N. Kumar, and V. K. Bhalla,
‘‘Lightweight and privacy-preserving RFID authentication scheme for
distributed IoT infrastructure with secure localization services for smart
city environment,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 83, pp. 629–637,
Jun. 2018.
[167] S. Kalra and S. K. Sood, ‘‘Secure authentication scheme for IoT and cloud
servers,’’ Pervas. Mobile Comput., vol. 24, pp. 210–223, Dec. 2015.
[168] D. Mishra, P. Vijayakumar, V. Sureshkumar, R. Amin, S. H. Islam,
and P. Gope, ‘‘Efficient authentication protocol for secure multimedia
communications in IoT-enabled wireless sensor networks,’’ Multimedia
Tools Appl., pp. 1–31, 2017.
[169] A. M. I. Alkuhlani and S. Thorat, ‘‘Lightweight anonymity-preserving
authentication and key agreement protocol for the Internet of Things
environment,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Intell. Inf. Technol. Singapore: Springer,
2017, pp. 108–125.
[170] G. Sharma and S. Kalra, ‘‘A secure remote user authentication scheme
for smart cities e-governance applications,’’ J. Reliable Intell. Environ.,
vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 177–188, Sep. 2017.
[171] F. Rahman, M. E. Hoque, and S. I. Ahamed, ‘‘AnonPri: A secure
anonymous private authentication protocol for RFID systems,’’ Inf. Sci.,
vol. 379, pp. 195–210, Feb. 2017.
[172] O. Ermiş, C. S. Bahtiyar, E. Anarım, and M. U. Çağlayan, ‘‘A key agreement protocol with partial backward confidentiality,’’ Comput. Netw.,
vol. 129, pp. 159–177, Dec. 2017.
[173] P. K. Dhillon and S. Kalra, ‘‘A lightweight biometrics based remote user
authentication scheme for IoT services,’’ J. Inf. Secur. Appl., vol. 34,
pp. 255–270, Jun. 2017.
[174] S. Raza, H. Shafagh, K. Hewage, R. Hummen, and T. Voigt, ‘‘Lithe:
Lightweight secure CoAP for the Internet of Things,’’ IEEE Sensors J.,
vol. 13, no. 10, pp. 3711–3720, Oct. 2013.
[175] J.-Y. Lee, W.-C. Lin, and Y.-H. Huang, ‘‘A lightweight authentication
protocol for Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. Int. Symp. Next-Gener. Electron.
(ISNE), May 2014, pp. 1–2.
[176] D. Garcia-Carrillo and R. Marin-Lopez, ‘‘Lightweight CoAP-based bootstrapping service for the Internet of Things,’’ Sensors, vol. 16, no. 3,
p. 358, Mar. 2016.
[177] T. Heer, O. Garcia-Morchon, R. Hummen, S. L. Keoh, S. S. Kumar, and
K. Wehrle, ‘‘Security challenges in the IP-based Internet of Things,’’
Wireless Pers. Commun., vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 527–542, Dec. 2011.
[178] J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. Sa Silva, ‘‘Security for the Internet of
Things: A survey of existing protocols and open research issues,’’ IEEE
Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1294–1312, 3rd Quart., 2015.
[179] Q. Guo, Y. Cui, X. Zou, and Q. Huang, ‘‘Generic construction of privacypreserving optimistic fair exchange protocols,’’ J. Internet Services Inf.
Secur., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 44–56, 2017.
167158

[180] N. Accettura and G. Piro, ‘‘Optimal and secure protocols in the IETF
6TiSCH communication stack,’’ in Proc. 23rd Int. Symp. Ind. Electron.
(ISIE), Jun. 2014, pp. 1469–1474.
[181] H. Syafruddin and A. S. J. Putra, ‘‘Performance analysis of using a reliable transport layer protocol for transmitting EAP message over RADIUS
in inter-domain WLAN roaming,’’ in Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. Inf. Commun.
Technol. Moslem World (ICT4M), Dec. 2010, pp. G1–G5.
[182] M. Nakhjiri and M. Nakhjiri, AAA and Network Security for Mobile
Access: Radius, Diameter, EAP, PKI and IP Mobility. Hoboken, NJ, USA:
Wiley, 2005.
[183] J. Irazabal, R. O. Laprida, D. A. Masini, and D. B. Ponceleon,
‘‘Blockchain enabled crowdsourcing,’’ U.S. Patent 15 789 635,
Apr. 25, 2019.
[184] V. Sharma, I. You, D. N. K. Jayakody, D. G. Reina, and K.-K.-R. Choo,
‘‘Neural-blockchain-based ultrareliable caching for edge-enabled UAV
networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 15, no. 10, pp. 5723–5736,
Oct. 2019.
[185] T. Hardjono, A. Lipton, and A. Pentland, ‘‘Toward an interoperability
architecture for blockchain autonomous systems,’’ IEEE Trans. Eng.
Manag., early access, Jun. 21, 2019, doi: 10.1109/TEM.2019.2920154.
[186] V. Sharma, I. You, F. Palmieri, D. N. K. Jayakody, and J. Li, ‘‘Secure
and energy-efficient handover in fog networks using blockchain-based
DMM,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 22–31, May 2018, doi:
10.1109/MCOM.2018.1700863.
[187] A. Alcaide, E. Palomar, J. Montero-Castillo, and A. Ribagorda, ‘‘Anonymous authentication for privacy-preserving IoT target-driven applications,’’ Comput. Secur., vol. 37, pp. 111–123, Sep. 2013.
[188] D. Evans and D. M. Eyers, ‘‘Efficient data tagging for managing privacy
in the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Green Comput.
Commun. (GreenCom), Nov. 2012, pp. 244–248.
[189] A. Ukil, S. Bandyopadhyay, J. Joseph, V. Banahatti, and S. Lodha,
‘‘Negotiation-based privacy preservation scheme in Internet of Things
platform,’’ in Proc. 1st Int. Conf. Secur. Internet Things, 2012, pp. 75–84.
[190] S. Pérez, D. Rotondi, D. Pedone, L. Straniero, M. J. Núñez, and
F. Gigante, ‘‘Towards the CP-ABE application for privacy-preserving
secure data sharing in IoT contexts,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Innov. Mobile
Internet Services Ubiquitous Comput. Cham, Switzerland: Springer,
2017, pp. 917–926.
[191] P. P. Jayaraman, X. Yang, A. Yavari, D. Georgakopoulos, and X. Yi, ‘‘Privacy preserving Internet of Things: From privacy techniques to a blueprint
architecture and efficient implementation,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst.,
vol. 76, pp. 540–549, Nov. 2017.
[192] S. Belguith, N. Kaaniche, M. Laurent, A. Jemai, and R. Attia, ‘‘PHOABE:
Securely outsourcing multi-authority attribute based encryption with policy hidden for cloud assisted IoT,’’ Comput. Netw., vol. 133, pp. 141–156,
Mar. 2018.
[193] O. Bamasag, ‘‘A lightweight privacy and integrity preserving data communication in smart grid,’’ Eur. J. Comput. Sci. Inf. Technol., vol. 3, no. 4,
pp. 21–30, 2015.
[194] C. Hu, J. Zhang, and Q. Wen, ‘‘An identity-based personal location system
with protected privacy in IoT,’’ in Proc. 4th IEEE Int. Conf. Broadband
Netw. Multimedia Technol. (IC-BNMT), Oct. 2011, pp. 192–195.
[195] C. Doukas, I. Maglogiannis, V. Koufi, F. Malamateniou, and
G. Vassilacopoulos, ‘‘Enabling data protection through PKI encryption
in IoT m-health devices,’’ in Proc. IEEE 12th Int. Conf. Bioinf. Bioeng.
(BIBE), Nov. 2012, pp. 25–29.
[196] X. Wang, J. Zhang, E. M. Schooler, and M. Ion, ‘‘Performance evaluation
of attribute-based encryption: Toward data privacy in the IoT,’’ in Proc.
IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. (ICC), Jun. 2014, pp. 725–730.
[197] D. Li, Z. Aung, J. Williams, and A. Sanchez, ‘‘p3: Privacy preservation
protocol for automatic appliance control application in smart grid,’’ IEEE
Internet Things J., vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 414–429, Oct. 2014.
[198] H. Bao and L. Chen, ‘‘A lightweight privacy-preserving scheme with data
integrity for smart grid communications,’’ Concurrency Comput. Pract.
Exper., vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 1094–1110, Mar. 2016.
[199] H. Bao and R. Lu, ‘‘A new differentially private data aggregation with
fault tolerance for smart grid communications,’’ IEEE Internet Things J.,
vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 248–258, Jun. 2015.
[200] T. Gong, H. Huang, P. Li, K. Zhang, and H. Jiang, ‘‘A medical healthcare
system for privacy protection based on IoT,’’ in Proc. 7th Int. Symp.
Parallel Archit., Algorithms Program. (PAAP), Dec. 2015, pp. 217–222.
[201] R. Lu, K. Heung, A. H. Lashkari, and A. A. Ghorbani, ‘‘A lightweight
privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for fog computing-enhanced
IoT,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 3302–3312, 2017.
VOLUME 8, 2020

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

[202] S. Mascetti, C. Bettini, and D. Freni, ‘‘Longitude: Centralized privacypreserving computation of users’ proximity,’’ in Proc. Workshop Secure
Data Manage. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2009, pp. 142–157.
[203] I. D. Addo, S. I. Ahamed, S. S. Yau, and A. Buduru, ‘‘A reference
architecture for improving security and privacy in Internet of Things
applications,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Mobile Services (MS), Jun. 2014,
pp. 108–115.
[204] Spore. Accessed: Sep. 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.lsv.fr/
Software/spore/table.html
[205] E. Vasilomanolakis, J. Daubert, M. Luthra, V. Gazis, A. Wiesmaier, and
P. Kikiras, ‘‘On the security and privacy of Internet of Things architectures and systems,’’ in Proc. Int. Workshop Secure Internet Things (SIoT),
Sep. 2015, pp. 49–57.
[206] I. Alqassem and D. Svetinovic, ‘‘A taxonomy of security and privacy
requirements for the Internet of Things (IoT),’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
Ind. Eng. Eng. Manage. (IEEM), Dec. 2014, pp. 1244–1248.
[207] H. Kupwade Patil and R. Seshadri, ‘‘Big data security and privacy issues
in healthcare,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Congr. Big Data (BigData Congr.),
Jun. 2014, pp. 762–765.
[208] E. Bertino, ‘‘Data security and privacy in the IoT.’’ in Proc. EDBT, 2016,
pp. 1–3.
[209] C. Perera, R. Ranjan, L. Wang, S. U. Khan, and A. Y. Zomaya, ‘‘Big data
privacy in the Internet of Things era,’’ IT Prof., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 32–39,
2015.
[210] Y. H. Hwang, ‘‘IoT security & privacy: Threats and challenges,’’ in Proc.
1st ACM Workshop IoT Privacy, Trust, Secur., 2015, p. 1.
[211] Z.-K. Zhang, M. C. Y. Cho, C.-W. Wang, C.-W. Hsu, C.-K. Chen, and
S. Shieh, ‘‘IoT security: Ongoing challenges and research opportunities,’’ in Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Service-Oriented Comput. Appl. (SOCA),
Nov. 2014, pp. 230–234.
[212] X. Jiang, X. Ge, J. Yu, F. Kong, X. Cheng, and R. Hao, ‘‘An efficient
symmetric searchable encryption scheme for cloud storage,’’ J. Internet
Services Inf. Secur., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 1–18, 2017.
[213] A.-R. Sadeghi, C. Wachsmann, and M. Waidner, ‘‘Security and privacy
challenges in industrial Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. 52nd Annu. Design
Autom. Conf., 2015, p. 54.
[214] A. F. Skarmeta, J. L. Hernandez-Ramos, and M. V. Moreno, ‘‘A decentralized approach for security and privacy challenges in the Internet of
Things,’’ in Proc. World Forum Internet Things (WF-IoT), Mar. 2014,
pp. 67–72.
[215] X.-J. Lin, L. Sun, and H. Qu, ‘‘Insecurity of an anonymous authentication
for privacy-preserving IoT target-driven applications,’’ Comput. Secur.,
vol. 48, pp. 142–149, Feb. 2015.
[216] M. R. Schurgot, D. A. Shinberg, and L. G. Greenwald, ‘‘Experiments with
security and privacy in IoT networks,’’ in Proc. 16th Int. Symp. A World
Wireless, Mobile Multimedia Netw. (WoWMoM), Jun. 2015, pp. 1–6.
[217] A. Campan and T. M. Truta, ‘‘Data and structural k-anonymity in social
networks,’’ in Privacy, Security, and Trust in KDD. Berlin, Germany:
Springer, 2009, pp. 33–54.
[218] J. Cheng, A. W.-C. Fu, and J. Liu, ‘‘K-isomorphism: Privacy preserving
network publication against structural attacks,’’ in Proc. ACM SIGMOD
Int. Conf. Manage. Data, 2010, pp. 459–470.
[219] L. Zou, L. Chen, and M. T. Özsu, ‘‘K-automorphism: A general framework for privacy preserving network publication,’’ Proc. VLDB Endowment, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 946–957, 2009.
[220] M. Abomhara and G. M. Køien, ‘‘Security and privacy in the Internet of
Things: Current status and open issues,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Privacy Secur.
Mobile Syst., May 2014, pp. 1–8.
[221] R. H. Weber, ‘‘Internet of Things—New security and privacy challenges,’’
Comput. Law Secur. Rev., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 23–30, 2010.
[222] D. Kozlov, J. Veijalainen, and Y. Ali, ‘‘Security and privacy threats
in IoT architectures,’’ in Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Body Area Netw., 2012,
pp. 256–262.
[223] A. Ukil, S. Bandyopadhyay, and A. Pal, ‘‘Privacy for IoT: Involuntary
privacy enablement for smart energy systems,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
Commun. (ICC), Jun. 2015, pp. 536–541.
[224] A. Ukil, S. Bandyopadhyay, and A. Pal, ‘‘IoT-privacy: To be private or
not to be private,’’ in Proc. IEEE Conf. Comput. Commun. Workshops
(INFOCOM WKSHPS), Apr. 2014, pp. 123–124.
[225] A. Dorri, S. S. Kanhere, R. Jurdak, and P. Gauravaram, ‘‘Blockchain for
IoT security and privacy: The case study of a smart home,’’ in Proc. IEEE
Int. Conf. Pervas. Comput. Commun. Workshops (PerCom Workshops),
Mar. 2017, pp. 618–623.
VOLUME 8, 2020

[226] A. Abhishta, R. Joosten, and L. J. Nieuwenhuis, ‘‘Comparing alternatives to measure the impact of DDoS attack announcements on target
stock prices,’’ J. Wireless Mobile Netw., Ubiquitous Comput., Dependable
Appl., vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1–18, 2017.
[227] I. Kotenko, I. Saenko, and A. Kushnerevich, ‘‘Parallel big data processing
system for security monitoring in Internet of Things networks,’’ J. Wireless Mobile Netw., Ubiquitous Comput., Dependable Appl., vol. 8, no. 4,
pp. 60–74, 2017.
[228] W. Zhou and S. Piramuthu, ‘‘Security/privacy of wearable fitness tracking
IoT devices,’’ in Proc. 9th Iberian Conf. Inf. Syst. Technol. (CISTI),
Jun. 2014, pp. 1–5.
[229] H. C. Pöhls, V. Angelakis, S. Suppan, K. Fischer, G. Oikonomou,
E. Z. Tragos, R. D. Rodriguez, and T. Mouroutis, ‘‘RERUM: Building
a reliable IoT upon privacy- and security- enabled smart objects,’’ in
Proc. Wireless Commun. Netw. Conf. Workshops (WCNCW), Apr. 2014,
pp. 122–127.
[230] V. Sivaraman, H. H. Gharakheili, A. Vishwanath, R. Boreli, and
O. Mehani, ‘‘Network-level security and privacy control for smart-home
IoT devices,’’ in Proc. IEEE 11th Int. Conf. Wireless Mobile Comput.,
Netw. Commun. (WiMob), Oct. 2015, pp. 163–167.
[231] K. Wrona, A. de Castro, and B. Vasilache, ‘‘Data-centric security in
military applications of commercial IoT technology,’’ in Proc. 3rd World
Forum Internet Things (WF-IoT), Dec. 2016, pp. 239–244.
[232] M. D. Alshehri and F. K. Hussain, ‘‘A centralized trust management mechanism for the Internet of Things (CTM-IoT),’’ in Proc. Int.
Conf. Broadband Wireless Comput., Commun. Appl. Cham, Switzerland:
Springer, 2017, pp. 533–543.
[233] I.-R. Chen, J. Guo, and F. Bao, ‘‘Trust management for SOA-based
IoT and its application to service composition,’’ IEEE Trans. Services
Comput., vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 482–495, May 2016.
[234] X. Wu and F. Li, ‘‘A multi-domain trust management model for supporting RFID applications of IoT,’’ PLoS ONE, vol. 12, no. 7, Jul. 2017,
Art. no. e0181124.
[235] J. Guo, I.-R. Chen, and J. J. P. Tsai, ‘‘A mobile cloud hierarchical
trust management protocol for IoT systems,’’ in Proc. 5th IEEE Int.
Conf. Mobile Cloud Comput., Services, Eng. (MobileCloud), Apr. 2017,
pp. 125–130.
[236] N. Peshwe and D. Das, ‘‘Algorithm for trust based policy hidden communication in the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. IEEE 42nd Conf. Local
Comput. Netw. Workshops (LCN Workshops), Oct. 2017, pp. 148–153.
[237] S. Ziegler, A. Skarmeta, J. Bernal, E. E. Kim, and S. Bianchi, ‘‘ANASTACIA: Advanced networked agents for security and trust assessment in
CPS IoT architectures,’’ in Proc. Global Internet Things Summit (GIoTS),
Jun. 2017, pp. 1–6.
[238] R. K. Chahal and S. Singh, ‘‘Fuzzy rule-based expert system for determining trustworthiness of cloud service providers,’’ Int. J. Fuzzy Syst.,
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 338–354, Apr. 2017.
[239] P. N. Mahalle, P. A. Thakre, N. R. Prasad, and R. Prasad, ‘‘A fuzzy
approach to trust based access control in Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. 3rd
Int. Conf. Wireless Commun., Veh. Technol., Inf. Theory Aerosp. Electron.
Syst. (VITAE), Jun. 2013, pp. 1–5.
[240] H. Son, N. Kang, B. Gwak, and D. Lee, ‘‘An adaptive IoT trust estimation scheme combining interaction history and stereotypical reputation,’’
in Proc. 14th IEEE Annu. Consum. Commun. Netw. Conf. (CCNC),
Jan. 2017, pp. 349–352.
[241] V. Sharma, I. You, R. Kumar, and P. Kim, ‘‘Computational offloading
for efficient trust management in pervasive online social networks using
osmotic computing,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 5084–5103, 2017.
[242] D. Chen, G. Chang, D. Sun, J. Li, J. Jia, and X. Wang, ‘‘TRM-IoT: A trust
management model based on fuzzy reputation for Internet of Things,’’
Comput. Sci. Inf. Syst., vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1207–1228, 2011.
[243] Z. A. Khan, J. Ullrich, A. G. Voyiatzis, and P. Herrmann, ‘‘A trust-based
resilient routing mechanism for the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. 12th Int.
Conf. Availability, Rel. Secur., 2017, p. 27.
[244] K. Kravari and N. Bassiliades, ‘‘ORDAIN: An ontology for trust management in the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. OTM Confederated Int.
Conf. Move Meaningful Internet Syst. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017,
pp. 216–223.
[245] I. Santos, F. Brezo, X. Ugarte-Pedrero, and P. G. Bringas, ‘‘Opcode
sequences as representation of executables for data-mining-based
unknown malware detection,’’ Inf. Sci., vol. 231, pp. 64–82, May 2013.
[246] R. Zhou, J. Pan, X. Tan, and H. Xi, ‘‘Application of CLIPS expert system
to malware detection system,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Comput. Intell. Secur.,
vol. 1, Dec. 2008, pp. 309–314.
167159

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

[247] A. Niki, ‘‘Drive-by download attacks: Effects and detection methods,’’ in
Proc. 3rd IT Secur. Conf. Next Gener., 2009.
[248] F. Gai, J. Zhang, P. Zhu, and X. Jiang, ‘‘Multidimensional trust-based
anomaly detection system in Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf.
Wireless Algorithms, Syst., Appl. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017,
pp. 302–313.
[249] J. Wang, I.-R. Chen, J. J. P. Tsai, and D.-C. Wang, ‘‘Trust-based mechanism design for cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks,’’ Comput. Commun., vol. 116, pp. 90–100, Jan. 2018.
[250] M. M. Ozcelik, E. Irmak, and S. Ozdemir, ‘‘A hybrid trust based intrusion
detection system for wireless sensor networks,’’ in Proc. Int. Symp. Netw.,
Comput. Commun. (ISNCC), May 2017, pp. 1–6.
[251] M. F. Hinarejos, F. Almenárez, P. A. Cabarcos, J. L. Ferrer-Gomila, and
A. M. López, ‘‘RiskLaine: A probabilistic approach for assessing risk in
certificate-based security,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 13,
no. 8, pp. 1975–1988, Aug. 2018.
[252] A. A. Obaidi and E. W. Yocam, ‘‘Persona and device based certificate
management,’’ U.S. Patent 14 985 273, Jul. 6, 2017.
[253] S. Namal, H. Gamaarachchi, G. MyoungLee, and T.-W. Um, ‘‘Autonomic
trust management in cloud-based and highly dynamic IoT applications,’’
in Proc. ITU Kaleidoscope Trust Inf. Soc. (K-2015), 2015, pp. 1–8.
[254] M. Nitti, R. Girau, L. Atzori, A. Iera, and G. Morabito, ‘‘A subjective
model for trustworthiness evaluation in the social Internet of Things,’’ in
Proc. 23rd Int. Symp. Pers., Indoor Mobile Radio Commun. (PIMRC),
Sep. 2012, pp. 18–23.
[255] N. A. Mhetre, A. V. Deshpande, and P. N. Mahalle, ‘‘Trust management
model based on fuzzy approach for ubiquitous computing,’’ Int. J. Ambient Comput. Intell., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 33–46, Jul. 2016.
[256] M. Nitti, R. Girau, and L. Atzori, ‘‘Trustworthiness management in the
social Internet of Things,’’ IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 26, no. 5,
pp. 1253–1266, May 2014.
[257] L. Gu, J. Wang, and B. Sun, ‘‘Trust management mechanism for Internet
of Things,’’ China Commun., vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 148–156, Feb. 2014.
[258] J. Duan, D. Gao, D. Yang, C. H. Foh, and H.-H. Chen, ‘‘An energy-aware
trust derivation scheme with game theoretic approach in wireless sensor
networks for IoT applications,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 1, no. 1,
pp. 58–69, Feb. 2014.
[259] I.-R. Chen, J. Guo, and F. Bao, ‘‘Trust management for service composition in SOA-based IoT systems,’’ in Proc. Wireless Commun. Netw. Conf.
(WCNC), Apr. 2014, pp. 3444–3449.
[260] J. P. Wang, S. Bin, Y. Yu, and X. X. Niu, ‘‘Distributed trust management
mechanism for the Internet of Things,’’ Appl. Mech. Mater., vol. 347,
pp. 2463–2467, Aug. 2013.
[261] Y. B. Saied, A. Olivereau, D. Zeghlache, and M. Laurent, ‘‘Trust management system design for the Internet of Things: A context-aware and multiservice approach,’’ Comput. Secur., vol. 39, pp. 351–365, Nov. 2013.
[262] S. A. M. Yusof, N. Zakaria, and N. Ab Rahman Muton, ‘‘Timely trust:
The use of IoT and cultural effects on swift trust formation within global
virtual teams,’’ in Proc. 8th Int. Conf. Inf. Technol. (ICIT), May 2017,
pp. 297–303.
[263] H. Al-Hamadi and I. R. Chen, ‘‘Trust-based decision making for health
IoT systems,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 1408–1419,
Oct. 2017.
[264] O. Ben Abderrahim, M. H. Elhdhili, and L. Saidane, ‘‘TMCoI-SIoT: A
trust management system based on communities of interest for the social
Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. 13th Int. Wireless Commun. Mobile Comput.
Conf. (IWCMC), Jun. 2017, pp. 747–752.
[265] Z. A. Khan and P. Herrmann, ‘‘A trust based distributed intrusion detection mechanism for Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. IEEE 31st Int. Conf. Adv.
Inf. Netw. Appl. (AINA), Mar. 2017, pp. 1169–1176.
[266] F. Bao and I.-R. Chen, ‘‘Trust management for the Internet of Things
and its application to service composition,’’ in Proc. Int. Symp. World
Wireless, Mobile Multimedia Netw. (WoWMoM), Jun. 2012, pp. 1–6.
[267] F. Bao and I.-R. Chen, ‘‘Dynamic trust management for Internet of Things
applications,’’ in Proc. Int. Workshop Self-Aware Internet Things, 2012,
pp. 1–6.
[268] R. Liu and W. Trappe, Securing Wireless Communications at the Physical
Layer, vol. 7. New York, NY, USA: Springer, 2010.
[269] I. U. Zaman, A. B. Lopez, M. A. Al Faruque, and O. Boyraz, ‘‘Polarization
mode dispersion-based physical layer key generation for optical fiber link
security,’’ Opt. Sensors, Paper JTu4A-20, Jul. 2017.
[270] Q. Xu, P. Ren, H. Song, and Q. Du, ‘‘Security enhancement for IoT
communications exposed to eavesdroppers with uncertain locations,’’
IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 2840–2853, 2016.
167160

[271] B. Chen, C. Zhu, L. Shu, M. Su, J. Wei, V. C. M. Leung, and
J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, ‘‘Securing uplink transmission for lightweight
single-antenna UEs in the presence of a massive MIMO eavesdropper,’’
IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 5374–5384, 2016.
[272] G. Zhang and H. Sun, ‘‘Secure distributed detection under energy constraint in IoT-oriented sensor networks,’’ Sensors, vol. 16, no. 12, p. 2152,
Dec. 2016.
[273] H. Hu, Z. Gao, X. Liao, and V. Leung, ‘‘Secure communications in CIoT
networks with a wireless energy harvesting untrusted relay,’’ Sensors,
vol. 17, no. 9, p. 2023, Sep. 2017.
[274] S. N. Islam, M. A. Mahmud, and A. M. T. Oo, ‘‘Secured communication
among IoT devices in the presence of cellular interference,’’ in Proc. IEEE
85th Veh. Technol. Conf. (VTC Spring), Jun. 2017, pp. 1–6.
[275] J. Choi, ‘‘Physical layer security for channel-aware random access with
opportunistic jamming,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 12,
no. 11, pp. 2699–2711, Nov. 2017.
[276] L. Hu, H. Wen, B. Wu, F. Pan, R.-F. Liao, H. Song, J. Tang, and
X. Wang, ‘‘Cooperative jamming for physical layer security enhancement
in Internet of Things,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 219–228,
Feb. 2018.
[277] Z. Li, T. Jing, L. Ma, Y. Huo, and J. Qian, ‘‘Worst-case cooperative
jamming for secure communications in CIoT networks,’’ Sensors, vol. 16,
no. 3, p. 339, Mar. 2016.
[278] D. Wei, L. Liang, M. Zhang, R. Qiao, and W. Huang, ‘‘A polarization
state modulation based physical layer security scheme for wireless communications,’’ in Proc. MILCOM IEEE Mil. Commun. Conf., Nov. 2016,
pp. 1195–1201.
[279] Z. Gao, H. Hu, D. Cheng, J. Xu, and X. Sun, ‘‘Physical layer security
based on artificial noise and spatial modulation,’’ in Proc. 8th Int. Conf.
Wireless Commun. Signal Process. (WCSP), Oct. 2016, pp. 1–5.
[280] Y. Li, T. Jiang, and J. Huang, ‘‘Compressed sensing method for secret key
generation based on MIMO channel estimation,’’ in Proc. 3rd Int. Conf.
Commun., Signal Process., Syst. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015,
pp. 419–428.
[281] A. Limmanee and W. Henkel, ‘‘Secure physical-layer key generation protocol and key encoding in wireless communications,’’ in Proc. GLOBECOM Workshops (GC Wkshps), Dec. 2010, pp. 94–98.
[282] W. Trappe, ‘‘The challenges facing physical layer security,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 16–20, Jun. 2015.
[283] A. Mukherjee, ‘‘Physical-layer security in the Internet of Things: Sensing
and communication confidentiality under resource constraints,’’ Proc.
IEEE, vol. 103, no. 10, pp. 1747–1761, Oct. 2015.
[284] T. Pecorella, L. Brilli, and L. Mucchi, ‘‘The role of physical layer security
in IoT: A novel perspective,’’ Information, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 49, Aug. 2016.
[285] J. Zhang, T. Duong, R. Woods, and A. Marshall, ‘‘Securing wireless
communications of the Internet of Things from the physical layer, an
overview,’’ Entropy, vol. 19, no. 8, p. 420, Aug. 2017.
[286] A. Kitana, I. Traore, and I. Woungang, ‘‘Impact study of a mobile botnet
over LTE networks.,’’ J. Internet Serv. Inf. Secur., vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1–22,
2016.
[287] Q. Xu, P. Ren, H. Song, and Q. Du, ‘‘Security-aware waveforms for
enhancing wireless communications privacy in cyber-physical systems
via multipath receptions,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 4, no. 6,
pp. 1924–1933, Dec. 2017.
[288] K. Zeng, ‘‘Physical layer key generation in wireless networks: Challenges
and opportunities,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 33–39,
Jun. 2015.
[289] D. Altolini, V. Lakkundi, N. Bui, C. Tapparello, and M. Rossi, ‘‘Low
power link layer security for IoT: Implementation and performance analysis,’’ in Proc. 9th Int. Wireless Commun. Mobile Comput. Conf. (IWCMC),
Jul. 2013, pp. 919–925.
[290] C. Lee, L. Zappaterra, K. Choi, and H.-A. Choi, ‘‘Securing smart home:
Technologies, security challenges, and security requirements,’’ in Proc.
IEEE Conf. Commun. Netw. Secur., Oct. 2014, pp. 67–72.
[291] L. Brilli, T. Pecorella, and L. Mucchi, ‘‘Physical layer security for IoT
devices configuration and key management-a proof of concept,’’ in Proc.
AEIT Int. Annu. Conf. (AEIT), 2016, pp. 1–6.
[292] J.-H. Lee, J.-M. Bonnin, and X. Lagrange, ‘‘Host-based distributed mobility management support protocol for IPv6 mobile networks,’’ in Proc.
IEEE 8th Int. Conf. Wireless Mobile Comput., Netw. Commun. (WiMob),
Oct. 2012, pp. 61–68.
[293] J.-H. Lee, J.-M. Bonnin, P. Seite, and H. Chan, ‘‘Distributed IP mobility
management from the perspective of the IETF: Motivations, requirements, approaches, comparison, and challenges,’’ IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 159–168, Oct. 2013.
VOLUME 8, 2020

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

[294] B. S. Ghahfarokhi and N. Movahhedinia, ‘‘Context gathering and
management for centralized context-aware handover in heterogeneous
mobile networks,’’ Turkish J. Electr. Eng. Comput. Sci., vol. 20, no. 6,
pp. 914–933, 2012.
[295] H.-S. Chai, J. Jeong, and C.-H. Cho, ‘‘Security analysis of fast interLMA domain handover scheme in proxy mobile IPv6 networks,’’ Pervas.
Mobile Comput., vol. 39, pp. 100–116, Aug. 2017.
[296] H.-S. Chai, J.-Y. Choi, and J. Jeong, ‘‘An enhanced secure mobility
management scheme for building IoT applications,’’ Procedia Comput.
Sci., vol. 56, pp. 586–591, 2015.
[297] B. Ndibanje, K. Kim, Y. Kang, H. Kim, T. Kim, and H. Lee, ‘‘A secure and
efficient mutual authentication hand-off protocol for sensor device support in Internet of Things,’’ Sensors Mater., vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 953–960,
2017.
[298] N. Saxena, S. Grijalva, and N. S. Chaudhari, ‘‘Authentication protocol
for an IoT-enabled LTE network,’’ ACM Trans. Internet Technol., vol. 16,
no. 4, p. 25, 2016.
[299] J. Cao, M. Ma, and H. Li, ‘‘An uniform handover authentication between
E-UTRAN and non-3GPP access networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 11, no. 10, pp. 3644–3650, Oct. 2012.
[300] Z. Haddad, M. Mahmoud, I. A. Saroit, and S. Taha, ‘‘Secure and efficient uniform handover scheme for LTE–A networks,’’ in Proc. Wireless
Commun. Netw. Conf. (WCNC), Apr. 2016, pp. 1–6.
[301] M.-S. Chiang, C.-M. Huang, P. B. Chau, S. Xu, H. Zhou, and D. Ren,
‘‘A forward fast media independent handover control scheme for proxy
mobile IPv6 (FFMIH-PMIPv6) over heterogeneous wireless mobile network,’’ Telecommun. Syst., vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 699–715, Aug. 2017.
[302] H. Ameur, M. Esseghir, L. Khoukhi, and L. Merghem-Boulahia,
‘‘Enhanced MIH (media independent handover) for collaborative green
wireless communications,’’ Int. J. Commun. Syst., vol. 30, no. 7, p. e3029,
May 2017.
[303] S. Raza, S. Duquennoy, J. Höglund, U. Roedig, and T. Voigt, ‘‘Secure
communication for the Internet of Things—A comparison of link-layer
security and IPsec for 6LoWPAN,’’ Secur. Commun. Netw., vol. 7, no. 12,
pp. 2654–2668, 2014.
[304] J. Swetina, G. Lu, P. Jacobs, F. Ennesser, and J. Song, ‘‘Toward a standardized common M2M service layer platform: Introduction to oneM2M,’’
IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 20–26, Jun. 2014.
[305] A. Rajaram, D. N. K. Jayakody, K. Srinivasan, B. Chen, and V. Sharma,
‘‘Opportunistic-harvesting: RF wireless power transfer scheme for multiple access relays system,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 16084–16099, 2017.
[306] M. Centenaro, L. Vangelista, A. Zanella, and M. Zorzi, ‘‘Long-range
communications in unlicensed bands: The rising stars in the IoT and
smart city scenarios,’’ IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 60–67,
Oct. 2016.
[307] M. Khan, S. Din, M. Gohar, A. Ahmad, S. Cuomo, F. Piccialli, and
G. Jeon, ‘‘Enabling multimedia aware vertical handover management in
Internet of Things based heterogeneous wireless networks,’’ Multimedia
Tools Appl., vol. 76, no. 24, pp. 25919–25941, Dec. 2017.
[308] H. Ju and Y. Yoo, ‘‘Efficient packet transmission utilizing vertical
handover in IoT environment,’’ J. KIISE, vol. 42, no. 6, pp. 807–816,
Jun. 2015.
[309] J. E. Luzuriaga, J. C. Cano, C. Calafate, P. Manzoni, M. Perez, and
P. Boronat, ‘‘Handling mobility in IoT applications using the MQTT
protocol,’’ in Proc. Internet Technol. Appl. (ITA), Sep. 2015, pp. 245–250.
[310] A. J. J. Valera, M. A. Zamora, and A. F. G. Skarmeta, ‘‘An architecture
based on Internet of Things to support mobility and security in medical environments,’’ in Proc. 7th IEEE Consum. Commun. Netw. Conf.,
Jan. 2010, pp. 1–5.
[311] A. S. Gaur, J. Budakoti, C.-H. Lung, and A. Redmond, ‘‘IoT-equipped
UAV communications with seamless vertical handover,’’ in Proc. IEEE
Conf. Dependable Secure Comput., Aug. 2017, pp. 459–465.
[312] K.-D. Baek and I.-Y. Ko, ‘‘Spatially cohesive service discovery and
dynamic service handover for distributed IoT environments,’’ in Proc. Int.
Conf. Web Eng. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017, pp. 60–78.
[313] T. Li, H. Zhou, H. Luo, I. You, and Q. Xu, ‘‘SAT-FLOW: Multi-strategy
flow table management for software defined satellite networks,’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 5, pp. 14952–14965, 2017.
[314] J.-H. Lee, J.-M. Bonnin, I. You, and T.-M. Chung, ‘‘Comparative handover performance analysis of IPv6 mobility management protocols,’’
IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron., vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 1077–1088, Mar. 2013.
[315] V. Sharma, J. D. Lim, J. N. Kim, and I. You, ‘‘SACA: Self-aware communication architecture for IoT using mobile fog servers,’’ Mobile Inf. Syst.,
vol. 2017, pp. 1–17, Apr. 2017.
VOLUME 8, 2020

[316] R. A. Khan and A. H. Mir, ‘‘Sensor fast proxy mobile IPv6 (SFPMIPv6)A framework for mobility supported IP-WSN for improving QoS and
building IoT,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Commun. Signal Process. (CCNC),
Apr. 2014, pp. 1593–1598.
[317] L. Ni, Y. Yuan, X. Wang, M. Zhang, and J. Zhang, ‘‘A location privacy
preserving scheme based on repartitioning anonymous region in mobile
social network,’’ Procedia Comput. Sci., vol. 129, pp. 368–371, Jan. 2018.
[318] G. Han, H. Wang, J. Jiang, W. Zhang, and S. Chan, ‘‘CASLP: A confused
arc-based source location privacy protection scheme in WSNs for IoT,’’
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 42–47, Sep. 2018.
[319] S. Zakhary and A. Benslimane, ‘‘On location-privacy in opportunistic mobile networks, a survey,’’ J. Netw. Comput. Appl., vol. 103,
pp. 157–170, Feb. 2018.
[320] D. Liao, G. Sun, H. Li, H. Yu, and V. Chang, ‘‘The framework and algorithm for preserving user trajectory while using location-based services
in IoT-cloud systems,’’ Cluster Comput., vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 2283–2297,
Sep. 2017.
[321] S. Mirzamohammadi, J. A. Chen, A. A. Sani, S. Mehrotra, and G. Tsudik,
‘‘Ditio: Trustworthy auditing of sensor activities in mobile & IoT
devices,’’ in Proc. 15th ACM Conf. Embedded Netw. Sensor Syst., 2017,
p. 28.
[322] T. Mao, C. Cao, X. Peng, and W. Han, ‘‘A privacy preserving data
aggregation scheme to investigate Apps installment in massive mobile
devices,’’ Procedia Comput. Sci., vol. 129, pp. 331–340, Jan. 2018.
[323] Y. Wang, Z. Cai, X. Tong, Y. Gao, and G. Yin, ‘‘Truthful incentive
mechanism with location privacy-preserving for mobile crowdsourcing
systems,’’ Comput. Netw., vol. 135, pp. 32–43, Apr. 2018.
[324] I. Ullah, M. A. Shah, A. Wahid, A. Mehmood, and H. Song, ‘‘ESOT: A
new privacy model for preserving location privacy in Internet of Things,’’
Telecommun. Syst., vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 553–575, Apr. 2018.
[325] G. Sun, V. Chang, M. Ramachandran, Z. Sun, G. Li, H. Yu, and D. Liao,
‘‘Efficient location privacy algorithm for Internet of Things (IoT) services
and applications,’’ J. Netw. Comput. Appl., vol. 89, pp. 3–13, Jul. 2017.
[326] R. M. Lopez, A. Dutta, Y. Ohba, H. Schulzrinne, and A. F. G. Skarmeta,
‘‘Network-layer assisted mechanism to optimize authentication delay
during handoff in 802.11 networks,’’ in Proc. 4th Annu. Int. Conf. Mobile
Ubiquitous Syst. Netw. Services, 2007, pp. 1–8.
[327] Y. He and D. Perkins, ‘‘BASH: A backhaul-aided seamless handoff
scheme for wireless mesh networks,’’ in Proc. Int. Symp. World Wireless,
Mobile Multimedia Netw., Jun. 2008, pp. 1–8.
[328] A. Fu, Y. Zhang, Z. Zhu, Q. Jing, and J. Feng, ‘‘An efficient handover
authentication scheme with privacy preservation for IEEE 802.16 M
network,’’ Comput. Secur., vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 741–749, 2012.
[329] Y. Zhang, X. Chen, J. Li, and H. Li, ‘‘Generic construction for secure
and efficient handoff authentication schemes in EAP-based wireless networks,’’ Comput. Netw., vol. 75, pp. 192–211, Dec. 2014.
[330] H.-Y. Chien, T.-H. Hsu, and Y.-L. Tang, ‘‘Fast pre-authentication with
minimized overhead and high security for WLAN handoff,’’ WSEAS
Trans. Comput., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 46–51, 2008.
[331] J. Choi and S. Jung, ‘‘A handover authentication using credentials based
on chameleon hashing,’’ IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 54–56,
Jan. 2010.
[332] A. A. Al Shidhani and V. C. M. Leung, ‘‘Fast and secure reauthentications
for 3GPP subscribers during WiMAX-WLAN handovers,’’ IEEE Trans.
Dependable Secure Comput., vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 699–713, Sep. 2011.
[333] M. Kalong, S. Ngamsuriyaroj, and V. Visoottiviseth, ‘‘Dynamic key
management for secure continuous handoff in wireless LAN,’’ in Proc.
6th Workshop Secure Netw. Protocols (NPSec), Oct. 2010, pp. 7–12.
[334] N. Saxena and A. Roy, ‘‘Novel framework for proactive handover
with seamless multimedia over WLANs,’’ IET Commun., vol. 5, no. 9,
pp. 1204–1212, Jun. 2011.
[335] Q. Jing, Y. Zhang, A. Fu, and X. Liu, ‘‘A privacy preserving handover
authentication scheme for EAP-based wireless networks,’’ in Proc. IEEE
Global Telecommun. Conf. (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2011, pp. 1–6.
[336] T. N. Nguyen and M. Ma, ‘‘Enhanced EAP-based pre-authentication for
fast and secure inter-ASN handovers in mobile WiMAX networks,’’ IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 2173–2181, Jun. 2012.
[337] C. Lai, H. Li, X. Liang, R. Lu, K. Zhang, and X. Shen, ‘‘CPAL: A
conditional privacy-preserving authentication with access linkability for
roaming service,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 46–57,
Feb. 2014.
[338] H.-Y. Chien and T.-H. Hsu, ‘‘Secure fast WLAN handoff using timebound delegated authentication,’’ Int. J. Commun. Syst., vol. 22, no. 5,
pp. 565–584, May 2009.
167161

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

[339] C. Ma, K. Xue, and P. Hong, ‘‘A proxy signature based re-authentication
scheme for secure fast handoff in wireless mesh networks.,’’ IJ Netw.
Secur., vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 122–132, 2013.
[340] D. He, J. Bu, S. Chan, and C. Chen, ‘‘Handauth: Efficient handover
authentication with conditional privacy for wireless networks,’’ IEEE
Trans. Comput., vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 616–622, Mar. 2013.
[341] C. Wang, M. Ma, and L. Zhang, ‘‘An efficient EAP-based preauthentication for inter-WRAN handover in TV white space,’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 5, pp. 9785–9796, 2017.
[342] J. Cao, H. Li, M. Ma, and F. Li, ‘‘UGHA: Uniform group-based handover
authentication for MTC within E-UTRAN in LTE-A networks,’’ in Proc.
IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. (ICC), Jun. 2015, pp. 7246–7251.
[343] Q. Kong, R. Lu, S. Chen, and H. Zhu, ‘‘Achieve secure handover session
key management via mobile relay in LTE-advanced networks,’’ IEEE
Internet Things J., vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 29–39, Feb. 2017.
[344] S. Feirer and T. Sauter, ‘‘Seamless handover in industrial WLAN using
IEEE 802.11k,’’ in Proc. 26th Int. Symp. Ind. Electron. (ISIE), 2017,
pp. 1234–1239.
[345] V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, I. You, and F.-Y. Leu, ‘‘An overview of
802.21a-2012 and its incorporation into IoT-fog networks using osmotic
framework,’’ in Proc. 3rd EAI Int. Conf. IoT Service, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[346] V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, I. You, and H.-C. Chen, ‘‘Fuzzy-based
protocol for secure remote diagnosis of IoT devices in 5G networks,’’
in Proc. 3rd EAI Int. Conf. IoT Service, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[347] R. Roman, J. Lopez, and M. Mambo, ‘‘Mobile edge computing, Fog et al.:
A survey and analysis of security threats and challenges,’’ Future Gener.
Comput. Syst., vol. 78, pp. 680–698, Jan. 2018.
[348] M. B. Mollah, M. A. K. Azad, and A. Vasilakos, ‘‘Security and privacy
challenges in mobile cloud computing: Survey and way ahead,’’ J. Netw.
Comput. Appl., vol. 84, pp. 38–54, Apr. 2017.
[349] M. R. Palattella, M. Dohler, A. Grieco, G. Rizzo, J. Torsner, T. Engel,
and L. Ladid, ‘‘Internet of Things in the 5G era: Enablers, architecture,
and business models,’’ IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 3,
pp. 510–527, Mar. 2016.
[350] H. Lin and N. Bergmann, ‘‘IoT privacy and security challenges for smart
home environments,’’ Information, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 44, Jul. 2016.
[351] A. Al-Fuqaha, M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari, and M. Ayyash,
‘‘Internet of Things: A survey on enabling technologies, protocols,
and applications,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 17, no. 4,
pp. 2347–2376, 4th Quart., 2015.
[352] S. L. Keoh, S. S. Kumar, and H. Tschofenig, ‘‘Securing the Internet of
Things: A standardization perspective,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 1,
no. 3, pp. 265–275, Jun. 2014.
[353] H.-C. Lee and K.-H. Ke, ‘‘Monitoring of large-area IoT sensors using
a LoRa wireless mesh network system: Design and evaluation,’’ IEEE
Trans. Instrum. Meas., vol. 67, no. 9, pp. 2177–2187, Sep. 2018.
[354] G. T. Garcia, V. M. Sanchez, C. N. L. Marin, J. I. Cortez,
C. A. R. Acevedo, G. S. Gonzalez, J. L. H. Ameca, and
M. D. C. M. Garcia, ‘‘Wireless sensor network for monitoring physical
variables applied to green technology (IoT green technology),’’ Eur. J.
Electr. Eng. Comput. Sci., vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 1–7, Feb. 2018.
[355] H. Wang, Z. Chen, J. Zhao, X. Di, and D. Liu, ‘‘A vulnerability assessment method in industrial Internet of Things based on attack graph and
maximum flow,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 8599–8609, 2018.
[356] V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, I. You, K. Lee, and K. Yim, ‘‘A framework for mitigating zero-day attacks in IoT,’’ 2018, arXiv:1804.05549.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.05549
[357] A. Abeshu and N. Chilamkurti, ‘‘Deep learning: The frontier for distributed attack detection in Fog-to-Things computing,’’ IEEE Commun.
Mag., vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 169–175, Feb. 2018.
[358] A. G. P. Lobato, M. A. Lopez, I. J. Sanz, A. A. Cardenas,
O. C. M. B. Duarte, and G. Pujolle, ‘‘An adaptive real-time architecture
for zero-day threat detection,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. (ICC),
May 2018, pp. 1–6.
[359] B. D. Weinberg, G. R. Milne, Y. G. Andonova, and F. M. Hajjat, ‘‘Internet
of Things: Convenience vs. privacy and secrecy,’’ Bus. Horizons, vol. 58,
no. 6, pp. 615–624, Nov. 2015.
[360] I. You and K. Yim, ‘‘Malware obfuscation techniques: A brief survey,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Broadband, Wireless Comput., Commun. Appl.
(BWCCA), Nov. 2010, pp. 297–300.
[361] S.-Y. Lee, S.-R. Wi, E. Seo, J.-K. Jung, and T.-M. Chung, ‘‘ProFIoT:
Abnormal behavior profiling (ABP) of IoT devices based on a machine
learning approach,’’ in Proc. 27th Int. Telecommun. Netw. Appl. Conf.
(ITNAC), Nov. 2017, pp. 1–6.
167162

[362] T. M. Shaashua and O. Shaashua, ‘‘Physical environment profiling
through Internet of Things integration platform,’’ U.S. Patent 9 871 865,
Jan. 16, 2018.
[363] J. A. Oravec, ‘‘Emerging ‘cyber hygiene’ practices for the Internet of
Things (IoT): Professional issues in consulting clients and educating users
on IoT privacy and security,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Prof. Commun. Conf.
(ProComm), Jul. 2017, pp. 1–5.
[364] A. Chowdhury, ‘‘Cyber attacks in mechatronics systems based on Internet
of Things,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Mechatronics (ICM), Feb. 2017,
pp. 476–481.
[365] I. Chochliouros, S. Ziegler, L. Bolognini, N. Alonistioti, M. Stamatelatos,
P. Kontopoulos, G. Mourikas, V. Vlachos, N. Gligoric, and M. Holst,
‘‘Enabling crowd-sourcing-based privacy risk assessment in EU: The
privacy flag project,’’ in Proc. 21st Pan-Hellenic Conf. Informat., 2017,
p. 31.
[366] R. Jiang, J. Luo, and X. Wang, ‘‘An attack tree based risk assessment
for location privacy in wireless sensor networks,’’ in Proc. 8th Int. Conf.
Wireless Commun., Netw. Mobile Comput. (WiCOM), 2012, pp. 1–4.
[367] R. Zheng, M. Zhang, Q. Wu, C. Yang, W. Wei, D. Zhang, and Z. Ma,
‘‘An IoT security risk autonomic assessment algorithm,’’ Telkomnika
Indonesian J. Electr. Eng., vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 819–826, Feb. 2013.
[368] C.-H. Liao, H.-H. Shuai, and L.-C. Wang, ‘‘Eavesdropping prevention
for heterogeneous Internet of Things systems,’’ in Proc. 15th IEEE Annu.
Consum. Commun. Netw. Conf. (CCNC), Jan. 2018, pp. 1–2.
[369] D. Soldani, Y. J. Guo, B. Barani, P. Mogensen, C.-L. I, and S. K. Das,
‘‘5G for ultra-reliable low-latency communications,’’ IEEE Netw., vol. 32,
no. 2, pp. 6–7, Mar./Apr. 2018.

VISHAL SHARMA (Member, IEEE) received the
B.Tech. degree in computer science and engineering from Punjab Technical University, in 2012, and
the Ph.D. degree in computer science and engineering from Thapar University, India, in 2016.
From November 2016 to March 2019, he worked
with the Department of Information Security Engineering, Soonchunhyang University, South Korea,
in multiple positions (from November 2016 to
December 2017: as a Postdoctoral Researcher;
January 2018 to March 2019: as a Research Assistant Professor). He also
held a joint postdoctoral position with Soongsil University, South Korea.
He was affiliated with the Industry-Academia Cooperation Foundation and
the Mobile Internet Security Laboratory, Soonchunhyang University. Before
this, he worked as a Lecturer with the Department of Computer Science
and Engineering, Thapar University. He is currently working as a Lecturer
(∼ Assistant Professor) with the School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EEECS), Queen’s University Belfast (QUB),
U.K. Before coming to QUB, he was a Research Fellow with the Information Systems Technology and Design (ISTD) Pillar, Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD), Singapore, where he worked
on the future-proof blockchain systems funded by SUTD-MoE. He has
authored/coauthored more than 100 journal/conference papers and book
chapters and co-edited two books with Springer. His areas of research and
interests are 5G networks, blockchain, aerial (UAV) communications, CPSIoT, and mobile Internet systems. He was a recipient of three best paper
awards from the International Conference on Communication, Management
and Information Technology (ICCMIT), Warsaw, Poland, in April 2017;
from CISC-S’17, South Korea, in June 2017; and from IoTaas, Taiwan,
in September 2017. He is a Professional Member of ACM and the past
Chair of ACM Student Chapter-TIET Patiala. He was the Track Chair of
MobiSec’16 and AIMS-FSS’16, and a PC Member and a Reviewer of
MIST’16 and MIST’17, respectively. He has served as the TPC Member for ETIC-2019, WiMO-2019, ITNAC-IEEE TCBD’17, ICCMIT’18,
CoCoNet’18, and ITNAC-IEEE TCBD’18. Also, he serves as a reviewer for
various ACM/IEEE TRANSACTIONS and other journals. He also serves as the
ATE for IEEE Communications Magazine and an Associate Editor for the
IET-CAAI TRIT. He has served/serving as a Guest Editor for MIS, IJDSN,
WCMC, and MDPI (Sensors, Drones, and Future Internet), and Autosoft
journals.
VOLUME 8, 2020

V. Sharma et al.: Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT): A Survey

ILSUN YOU (Senior Member, IEEE) received
the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in computer science
from Dankook University, Seoul, South Korea,
in 1997 and 2002, respectively, and the Ph.D.
degree from Kyushu University, Japan, in 2012.
From 1997 to 2004, he was with THINmultimedia
Inc., Internet Security Company Ltd., and Hanjo
Engineering Company Ltd., as a Research Engineer. He is currently a Full Professor with the
Department of Information Security Engineering,
Soonchunhyang University. He is a Fellow of the IET. He has served or
is currently serving as a General Chair or a Program Chair for international conferences and workshops, such as WISA’19-20, MobiSec’16-19,
AsiaARES’13-15, MIST’09-17, MobiWorld’08-17, and so forth. He is the
Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous
Computing, and Dependable Applications (JoWUA). He is in the Editorial
Board for Information Sciences (INS), the Journal of Network and Computer Applications (JNCA), IEEE ACCESS, Intelligent Automation & Soft
Computing (AutoSoft), the International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous
Computing (IJAHUC), Computing and Informatics (CAI), and the Journal of
High Speed Networks (JHSN). Especially, he has focused on 4/5G security,
security for wireless networks & mobile internet, IoT security, and so forth
while publishing more than 180 articles in these areas.
KARL ANDERSSON (Senior Member, IEEE)
received the M.Sc. degree in computer science and
technology from the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, and the Ph.D. degree
in mobile systems from the Luleå University of
Technology, Sweden. After pursuing postdoctoral
research at the Internet Real-time Laboratory,
Columbia University, New York, USA, and the
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Tokyo, Japan. He is currently
an Associate Professor of pervasive and mobile computing with the Luleå
University of Technology. His research interests include green and mobile
computing, the Internet of Things, cloud technologies, and information
security. He is a member of ACM.
FRANCESCO PALMIERI received two Italian
Laurea M.S. degrees and the Ph.D. degree in computer science from the University of Salerno, Italy.
He is currently a Full Professor with the University of Salerno. Previously, he has been an Associate Professor with the University of Salerno,
an Assistant Professor with the Second University of Naples, and the Director of the Telecommunication and Networking Division, Federico II
University, Naples, Italy. At the start of his career,
he also worked for several international companies on networking-related
projects. He has been closely involved with the development of the Internet
in Italy as a Senior Member of the Technical-Scientific Advisory Committee
and of the CSIRT of the Italian NREN GARR. He has published a large
number (more than 200) of papers in leading technical journals, books, and
conferences. His major research interests include high performance networking protocols and architectures, routing algorithms, and network security.
The actual focus of his scientific exploration and dissemination activity
concern the use of soft computing, optimization, and artificial intelligence
technologies for solving challenging problems in the above areas. He also
serves as the Editor-in-Chief of an international journal (Journal of High
Speed Networks) and is part of the Editorial Board or an Associate Editor of
several other well reputed ones (i.e., the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE
AND SECURE COMPUTING, the Journal of Networks and Computer Applications,
Information Sciences, Future generation Computer Systems, Applied Soft
Computing, Soft Computing, and the International Journal of Intelligent
Systems). He also guest edited many special issues in leading technical
journals (i.e., the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, the Journal
of Networks and Computer Applications, Information Sciences, and many
others). In his career, he has been involved, by also assuming strategic roles, in several national and international research and network development
VOLUME 8, 2020

projects. Finally, he participated to several technology transfer initiatives
also involving leading companies operating in the networking and security
sectors.

MUBASHIR HUSAIN REHMANI (Senior Member, IEEE) received the B.Eng. degree in computer
systems engineering from the Mehran University
of Engineering and Technology, Jamshoro, Pakistan, in 2004, the M.S. degree from the University
of Paris XI, Paris, France, in 2008, and the Ph.D.
degree from the University Pierre and Marie Curie,
Paris, in 2011. He is currently working as an Assistant Lecturer with the Department of Computer
Science, Cork Institute of Technology, Ireland.
Prior to this, he worked as a Postdoctoral Researcher with the Telecommunications Software and Systems Group (TSSG), Waterford Institute of
Technology (WIT), Waterford, Ireland. He also served for five years as an
Assistant Professor at the COMSATS Institute of Information Technology,
Wah Cantt., Pakistan. He has authored/edited two books published by IGI
Global, USA, one book published by CRC Press, USA, and one book
with Wiley, U.K. He received Best Researcher of the Year 2015 of COMSATS Wah Award in 2015. He also received the certificate of appreciation,
Exemplary Editor of the IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS for
the year 2015 from the IEEE Communications Society. He received Best
Paper Award from IEEE ComSoc Technical Committee on Communications
Systems Integration and Modeling (CSIM), in IEEE ICC 2017. He consecutively received research productivity award in 2016–2017 and also ranked
# 1 in all Engineering disciplines from the Pakistan Council for Science
and Technology (PCST), Government of Pakistan. He received Best Paper
Award in 2017 from Higher Education Commission (HEC), Government
of Pakistan. He was a recipient of Best Paper Award in 2018 from the
Journal of Network and Computer Applications (Elsevier). He is also an
Area Editor of the IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS. He has
served for three years (from 2015 to 2017) as an Associate Editor for the
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS. He is also serving as Column
Editor for Book Reviews in IEEE Communications Magazine. He also serves
as an Associate Editor for IEEE Communications Magazine, the Journal of
Network and Computer Applications (JNCA) Elsevier, and the Journal of
Communications and Networks (JCN). He is also serving as a Guest Editor for Ad Hoc Networks (Elsevier), Future Generation Computer Systems
(Elsevier), the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, and Pervasive
and Mobile Computing (Elsevier).

JAEDEOK LIM received the M.S. degree in electronic engineering from Kyungbook National University, South Korea, in 2001, and the Ph.D. degree
in computer engineering from Chungnam National
University, South Korea, in 2013. He is currently
a Principal Researcher with the Information Security Research Division, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI). His
research interests include the IoT security, mobile
security, access control, secure operating systems,
and system security.

167163

